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ABSTRACT
The primary goal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA") is to connect Americans with affordable, medically necessary
health care. The first step toward achieving that goal is insurance
expansion. The ACA's first two years of insurance expansion have
allowed millions of Americans to join the ranks of the insured. The
second step recognizes that the content of health coverage matters, as
appropriate insurance connects consumers with necessary care. The
ACA therefore requires most plans offered in the individual and small-
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group markets to cover a slate of ten essential health benefits. There is a
third necessary step in fulfilling the promise of the ACA, however. Once
people are connected with insurance plans covering essential health
benefits, it is vitally important that the plans deliver on the promise to
provide necessary care in a timely, appropriate manner. The expanded
health insurance markets, however, are built on the state-regulated,
market-driven health insurance system that predated the passage of the
ACA. Whether consumers fare well or poorly after the ACA will depend
on the market behavior of the health insurers selling individual and
small-group plans.
This Article focuses on four aspects of the market behavior of
private health insurance plans that have historically caused concern: (1)
contractual exclusions of certain categories of care from coverage, (2)
utilization review and "medical necessity" judgments, (3) restricted
provider networks, and (4) discrimination in plan design and
administration. With regard to all four aspects, this Article contends that
there continues to be a need for monitoring by advocates, federal and
state regulators, and others, as well as for targeted enforcement, to ensure
that the promise of the ACA is fulfilled. Information derived from
monitoring and enforcement should in turn create a feedback loop
enabling federal and state policymakers to determine where regulatory
reform is needed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA") is to connect Americans with affordable, medically necessary
health care.' The first step toward achieving that goal is insurance
expansion. The ACA's initial open enrollment period for private
insurance ended in the spring of 2014 with approximately eight million
enrolled through state or federal health insurance exchanges, and another
five million enrolled in ACA-compliant plans sold outside the
exchanges.2 The second step recognizes that the content of health
coverage matters, as appropriate insurance connects consumers with
necessary care. The ACA therefore requires most plans offered in the
individual and small group markets to cover a slate of ten essential health
benefits ("EHBs").
3
The ACA has been successful in expanding coverage, including
coverage in the small group and individual markets in which EHB
requirements apply.4 EHB requirements, in turn, are intended to
supplement the coverage requirements in state law to ensure that the
beneficiaries of most individual and small group plans receive coverage
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified primarily in various sections of Titles 5,
18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 31, and 42 of the United States Code). PPACA is often referred to as
the "Affordable Care Act," or the "ACA," and will be referred to as such herein. The
ACA "fulfilled [President Obama's] goal of extending health-insurance coverage to
virtually all Americans." Michael J. Graetza & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional
Uncertainty and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 343, 343 (2013).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE:
SUMMARY ENROLLMENT REPORT FOR THE INITIAL OPEN ENROLLMENT PERIOD 7 (May
2014).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012) (requiring insurers in the individual and small
group markets to cover EHBs); 42 U.S.C.§ 18022(b)(1) (defining the "general categories
and the items and services" included in EHBs).
4. See Survey: Nearly 9 in 10 US Adults Now Have Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.con/aponline/2015/04/13/us/politics/ap-us-health-
overhaul-uninsured.html.
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that is comprehensive and responsive to most peoples' health care
needs.5 These two steps-making insurance available, and requiring that
most individual and small group plans promise to cover health services
mandated by state and federal law-are not, however, enough to assure
that consumers in the individual and small group markets will have
appropriate access to medically necessary services. The third step is
ensuring that the plans deliver on the promise to provide necessary care
in a timely, appropriate manner.6
The expanded health insurance markets are built on the state-
regulated, market-driven health insurance system that predated the
passage of the ACA.7 Whether consumers fare well or poorly after the
ACA will depend on the market behavior of the health insurers selling
individual and small group plans. This Article focuses on four aspects of
the market behavior of private health insurance plans that have
historically caused concern: (1) contractual exclusions of certain
categories of care from coverage; (2) utilization review and "medical
necessity" judgments; (3) restricted provider networks; and (4)
discrimination in plan design and administration.
In Part II, this Article describes explicit contract exclusions. Plans
can shape the services they cover by defining what will and will not be
covered. The state and federal regulatory structure surrounding the
individual and small group markets provides guidance on these coverage
terms. Evaluation of the contract terms permits assessment of insurers'
fidelity to the existing regulatory requirements. It also will allow an
assessment of the extent to which federal and state regulatory structures
serve the goals of the ACA, and whether regulatory adjustments are in
order.
In Part III, this Article discusses cases in which insurers deny
coverage of services because they determine that the services requested
are not medically necessary in light of the insured's individual
circumstances. These cases are fact specific, but they are subject to
internal and external appeals processes that are intended to assure
principled, appropriate decisions. Proper medical necessity decision-
making approves medically appropriate care and denies inappropriate
care. Evaluation of the processes for medical necessity decision-making
5. See KATE GREENWOOD ET AL., SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. FOR HEALTH
& PHARM. LAW & POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS REQUIREMENT
IN NEW JERSEY: DECISION POINTS AND POLICY ISSUES iii (Aug. 2012).
6. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.235(c) (2014) (requiring that Qualified Health Plans'
networks of providers "ensure reasonable and timely access to a broad range of such
providers"); see infra notes 197-205.
7. See Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, The Patchwork. Health Reform,
American Style, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 125, 127 (2011).
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could provide some indication of plans' willingness to exercise sound
discretion.
In Part IV, this Article addresses network adequacy. It is a central
function of insurers to create and maintain networks of health care
providers who can provide necessary care in a professional, cost-
effective, and timely manner. In the interest of holding down premiums,
plans have established relatively narrow provider networks. In addition,
some have created tiered networks, in which consumer cost-sharing
differs by provider tier. These restricted networks can have benefits for
consumers, to the extent that they make plans more affordable. They
could also, in theory at least, steer consumers to high-quality providers.
Restricted networks, however, can also prevent consumers from
accessing the providers they need when they need them.
In Part V, this Article addresses the fairness with which plans'
terms apply to different classes of insureds. The ACA was intended to
end discrimination on the basis of health history, disability, and other
characteristics. Discriminatory actions can be overt or subtle. When it
arises, discriminatory exclusion from necessary services on the basis of
forbidden categories works a double wrong: denial of needed care and
harmful discriminatory injury.
Part VI concludes, contending that with regard to all four areas of
potential concern, there continues to be a need for monitoring by
advocates, federal and state regulators, and others, as well as for targeted
enforcement, to ensure that the promise of the ACA is fulfilled.
Information derived from monitoring and enforcement should in turn
create a feedback loop enabling federal and state policymakers to
determine where regulatory reform is needed.
II. CONTRACTUAL EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
Insurance contracts must define the scope of coverage, and how
they are written affects both consumer access to care and notice of what
is covered under the policy. One tool insurers have used to limit the care
for which they are obligated to pay is to explicitly exclude certain
services from coverage in the insurance contract.8 In some cases, the
categories of excluded coverage can be quite broad, such as those
excluding "experimental" services.9 Determining if a once-experimental
8. See Amy Monahan, Fairness v. Welfare in Health Insurance Content Regulation,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 200, 218 (2012).
9. See id.; see also William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity,
Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53
DUKE L.J. 597, 605 (2003).
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treatment has become medically accepted requires professional
assessment and expert judgment.°
A second category of exclusions provides more clarity, although it
also may raise controversy. Some of the common specific contractual
exclusions have included dental care, assisted reproductive technologies,
surgical treatment of obesity, and gender transition-related health care,
including sex reassignment surgery.'1 These exclusions do not suffer
from the indeterminacy problem often attendant to exclusions for
experimental treatments. Instead, they raise substantive objections. For
example, a common categorical exclusion is that for cosmetic surgery.
Many contracts exclude cosmetic surgery on the apparent grounds that
insurance need not cover treatments that offer no health benefits, but
instead serve the aesthetic preferences of the insured.12 In some cases,
however, it is contestable whether cosmetic surgery ought to be covered.
Reconstructive breast surgery following a mastectomy, for example, is
clearly "cosmetic," but excluding it invites the higher-order objection
that insurance policies ought to include reconstructive surgery following
mastectomy for public policy reasons.
A. Federal and State Efforts to Regulate Contract Exclusions Prior to
the Affordable Care Act
Regulators have responded to contract exclusions by requiring
coverage of certain health benefits in the name of maintaining consumer
access to appropriate healthcare. Health insurance mandates tend to take
three general forms: (1) service or benefit mandates, which require
coverage of specific health benefits, such as mammography and prostate
cancer screening; (2) provider mandates, which require coverage of
particular providers like chiropractors, if coverage is offered for another
type of provider, such as physicians; and (3) coverage mandates, which
require coverage of identifiable groups such as adopted children,
newborns, and domestic partners.13 Regulators have used mandates to
define what insurance contracts must include as a means of advancing
consumer protection and public health.
Prior to the ACA, Congress had taken some steps to ensure
coverage of specific health care services. In 1996, for example,
Congress passed the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act,
10. Id. at 603-04.
11. Id.; see also Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of
Weight-Reduction Surgery, 53 DuKE L.J. 653, 662 (2003).
12. See Monahan, supra note 8.
13. See Tracey A. LaPierre et al., Estimating the Impact of State Health Insurance
Mandates on Premium Costs in the Individual Market, J. OF INS. REG., at 4-5 (Mar. 1,
2009).
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which requires group health plans covering hospital stays related to
childbirth to cover at least a forty-eight hour hospital stay for new
mothers and their infants.14 After substantial public debate on the policy
reasons for and against precluding coverage, Congress also acted in 1998
to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")15  to mandate coverage for post-mastectomy breast
reconstruction.
16
But given that the states are the primary regulators of commercial
insurance, it is not surprising that most mandates are the product of state
regulation.1 7 Every state has passed benefit mandates, although states
vary widely in the number and scope of mandates. While the first
recorded state mandate dates back to 1949, many mandates were passed
in response to the consumer backlash against managed care in the
1990s.18 There are varying estimates of the aggregate number of
mandates nationally. The Council on Affordable Health Insurance
("CAHI"), for example, estimates that in 2012, the states had an
aggregate of 2,271 mandated benefits, with the majority of states having
more than forty mandates each.19 Rhode Island led the states with sixty-
nine mandated benefits, whereas Idaho had the least with thirteen.2 °
CAHI's counts include benefit, provider, and coverage mandates as
well as so-called "offer" mandates, which merely require plans to offer
consumers the opportunity to purchase policies that cover particular
services, providers, or populations. Offer mandates do not require plans
to include these services unless a consumer chooses to purchase that
coverage.21 A 2007 study that excluded offer mandates found an average
14. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVCS., Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act (NMJ-PA),
CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Other-Insurance-
Protections/nmhpa factsheet.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
15. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185(b). See Cristine Nardi, Comment, When Health Insurers
Deny Coverage For Breast Reconstructive Surgery: Gender Meets Disability, 1997 WISC.
L. REV. 777 (advocating for the passage of federal legislation to mandate insurance
coverage for post-mastectomy breast reconstruction).
17.Although states are the primary source of health insurance mandates, they do not
have authority to impose mandate requirements on most self-funded plans. See LaPierre
et al., supra note 13, at 6.
18.Seeid. at 4, 6.
19.See COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., CAHI Identifies 2,271 State Health
Insurance Mandates (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.cahi.org/article.asp?id=1115; VICTORIA
CRAIG BUNCE, THE COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., HEALTH INSURANCE
MANDATES IN THE STATES 2012: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2013).
20. See BUNCE, supra note 19.
21. LaPierre et al., supra note 13, at 4-5; CHERYL ULMER ET AL., ESSENTIAL HEALTH
BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 71 n.21 (2012).
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of eighteen mandates per state, noting a high of thirty-five in California
and a low of two in Idaho.22 The National Conference of State
Legislatures reports that nationally there currently are more than 1,900
state health insurance mandates.23
Focusing on benefit mandates that require coverage of specific
health services, as of early 2008, the states had adopted 1,088 total
benefit mandates requiring coverage of 79 unique benefit mandates.
24
CAHI reports that among the most popular mandates in 2012 were
mammography screening (50 states), maternity minimum stay (50
states), breast reconstruction (49 states), mental health parity (48 states),
and alcohol and substance abuse treatment (46 states). On the other
extreme of the spectrum, breast implant removal, cardiovascular disease
screening, circumcision, gastric electrical stimulation, and organ
transplant donor coverage each were mandated in only one state.26
Mandates are a hotly contested issue in insurance regulation. In
addition to the normative claim that mandates unfairly impinge on the
right to free contracting, opponents also often make the empirical
argument that mandates raise premiums for all consumers, thereby
27contributing to rates of uninsurance. CAHI, for example, estimates that
mandated benefits "increase the cost of basic health coverage from
slightly less than 10 percent to more than 50 percent, depending on the
state, specific legislative language, and type of health insurance
policy.
28
The Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), however, found that there is "no
consensus regarding the price impact of mandates or the effect that any
price increase has on coverage rates.29  To the contrary, evidence
suggests that while some mandates contribute to increased premiums,
others reduce premiums. One study published in the Journal of
Insurance Regulation in 2009 found such mixed results when it
evaluated the effect of mandates on individual market premiums: while
therapeutic services and alternatives to hospitalization were associated
with higher premiums, women and children mandates, alternative
medicine, emergency services, screening services, physician substitutes,
22. See ULMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 71.
23. See NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, State Health Insurance Mandates and
the ACA Essential Benefits Provisions, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-ins-
mandates-and-aca-essential-benefits.aspx (lasted updated June 2014).
24. See LaPierre et al., supra note 13, at 4.
25. See COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 19.
26. See id.
27. See ULMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 72.
28. COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 19.
29. ULMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 72.
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and counseling were associated with lower premiums.30 The study also
showed there was no correlation between the number of mandates a state
enacted and premium levels in that state.3'
In addition, proponents of mandates point out that failing to
mandate benefits could also have costs. If a consumer foregoes
appropriate care because it is not covered by insurance and then gets
sicker, he or she could require more expensive care.32 Mandates, then,
can help achieve health policy goals and correct market failures.33
To achieve these positive ends, however, mandates must be
medically appropriate. As reported by the IOM, there are concerns "that
mandates are not evidence-based and do not always reflect clinical best
practices.34  Although the majority of states require mandate benefit
studies before new mandates can be adopted,35 few states "require
prospective, expert analysis of evidence for a mandate before it can be
voted on by the legislature.36 The IOM has lamented that, even where
states establish robust review procedures, "there is little evidence that the
review procedure leads to evidence-based mandates that significantly
improve health outcomes.
37
As part of ongoing debates about the costs of health care, there have
been federal legislative proposals to limit mandates by, for example,
permitting the sale of national or statewide plans that would only need to
comply with mandates passed by at least forty-five states.38 To date,
these efforts have been unsuccessful, but the debates rage on. As Tracey
LaPierre and her colleagues concluded after studying the effect of
mandates on premiums, "[m]andates... should not be viewed as
unambiguously bad or good; careful policy requires separating the wheat
from the chaff, but doing so will require more fine-grained work ....
30. See LaPierre et al., supra note 13, at 2. The authors note that their findings are
not consistent with other research on the effect of mandates, which find both positive and
negative effects on premiums and thus call for more research. See id. at 29.
31. See id. at 4.
32. See Michael Bihari, M.D., Mandated Benefits - Understanding Mandated Health
Insurance Benefits Health Benefit Mandates Are Controversial, ABOUT.COM (updated
June 13, 2014),
http://healthinsurance.about.com/od/reform/a/mandatedbenefitsoverview.htm.
33. See ULMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 72.
34. Id.
35. See LaPierre et al., supra note 13, at 4.
36. See ULMERET AL., supra note 21, at 72.
37. Id.
38. LaPierre et al., supra note 13, at 4.
39. Id. at 33.
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B. How the ACA Addresses Contract Exclusions
To ensure that health coverage is meaningful and medically
appropriate, the ACA includes provisions to restrict insurers' ability to
exclude vital medical benefits from coverage. Since September 23,
2010, non-grandfathered4° individual and group health plans must
provide preventive health services to enrollees without any cost-sharing
when those services are provided by a network provider.41  The ACA
looks to recommendations of the United States Preventive Services Task
Force, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Health Resources
and Services Administration to define preventive health services.42 What
is deemed a preventive health service will evolve as evidence becomes
available,43 but currently a variety of services for adults," women,45 and
children46 are covered, such as blood pressure and depression screening
for all adults, specified immunization vaccines for adults and children,
breast cancer mammography screenings every one to two years for
women over forty, and autism screening for children at eighteen and
twenty-four months.47 Although some plans already provided full
coverage of preventive services before the ACA, it is estimated that
"approximately 76 million Americans-and 30 million women-are now
eligible to receive expanded coverage of one or more preventive services
because of the Affordable Care Act.",
48
40. A "grandfathered health plan" is a plan that was in existence on March 23, 2010,
and has not changed in terms of important features including the elimination of benefits
for a particular condition, changes in member cost-sharing requirements, or decreased
contribution rates by the plan's sponsor. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251 (g) (2015).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012).
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, For High-Risk Women, Some Breast Cancer Drugs To
Be Free, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/2014/01/breast-cancer-drugs-to-be-free-
for-high-risk-women/.
44. See Preventive care benefits: Preventive health services for adults,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive-care-
benefits/adults (last visited June 14, 2015).
45. See, Preventive care benefits: Preventive health services for women,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive-care-
benefits/women (last visited June 14, 2015).
46. See Preventive care benefits: Preventive health services for children,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive-care-
benefits/children (last visited June, 2015).
47. Id, See Preventive care benefits: Preventive health services for adults, supra
note 44; Preventive care benefits: Preventive health services for women, supra note
48. AMY BURKE & ADELLE SIMMONS, OFFICE OF THE ASST. SEC'Y FOR PLANNING &
EVAL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVCS., INCREASED COVERAGE OF PREVENTIVE
SERVICES WITH ZERO COST SHARING UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2, 4 (June 27,
2014).
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Beginning in 2014, the ACA also requires non-grandfathered health
insurance plans offered in the individual and small-group markets, both
on- and off-exchange, to offer a slate of ten essential health benefits.49
These benefits are equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical
employer plan: ambulatory patient services; emergency services;
hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance
use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; prescription
drugs; rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory
services; preventive and wellness services and chronic disease
management; and pediatric services that include oral and vision care.50
By itemizing EHB categories, Congress was aiming to ensure that
individual and small-group plans would offer uniform, comprehensive
coverage.51 But Congress left it to the Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to define the content of each
category and establish a system for monitoring and enforcement, subject
52to statutory requirements. For nearly two years following the passage
of the ACA, both public and private entities, including the IOM,
Department of Labor, the Mercer consulting firm, and HHS itself,
invested considerable effort to flesh out the specific contours of the ten
general EHB categories.53  The expectation was that HHS would
establish a national standard for EHB, as suggested by the IOM.
54
But the Secretary surprised many by choosing, at least for plan
years 2014 and 2015, to devolve much of the task of defining EHB to the
states.55 States have the opportunity to select a benchmark plan from a
menu of existing health care plans identified by HHS, namely: (1) the
largest plan by enrollment in any of the state's three largest small-group
insurance products; (2) any of the largest three state employee health
benefit plans by enrollment; (3) any of the three national Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program ("FEHBP") plan options by
enrollment; or (4) the largest insured commercial non-Medicaid HMOs
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-6(a), 18022 (2012). The ACA also includes EHB
provisions that apply only to qualified health plans. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(E)
(requirements regarding emergency department services); 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(F)
(recognizing an exception for QHPs that do not offer pediatric oral coverage when the
same exchange offers a standalone pediatric dental option).
50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-6(a), 18022.
51. See JUSTIN GIOVANNELLI ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: REVISITING THE ACA's ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
REQUIREMENTS 1 (Oct. 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue-
brief/2014/oct/1783_giovannelli implementingaca _essential hlt benefitsrb.pdf.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b); see generally Greenwood et al., supra note 5.
53. See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 5-6.
54. See ULMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
55. See GIOVANNELLI ET AL., supra note 51.
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operating in the State.6 The default benchmark in states that decline to
select a benchmark is "the largest plan by enrollment in the largest
product by enrollment in the State's small-group market."57 Where the
benchmark plan does not include services from each of the ten EHB
categories, states must supplement it, as detailed in the implementing
regulations.58 Carriers have the option to adopt the benchmark plan or to
make actuarially equivalent substitutions to benefits within each EHB
category in the benchmark to create a substantially equal package of
benefits with regard to "both the scope of benefits offered and any
limitations on those benefits[,] such as visit limits."59 Regardless of the
benchmark selected, EHB is deemed to include the preventive health
services that are required to be provided without cost-sharing, as
discussed above.60
C. Next Steps for Coverage Regulation
There are a number of open issues related to EHB implementation.
HHS's interim implementation approach rests on benchmarks sold in the
states prior to the ACA. Many pre-ACA plans were covering services in
many of the EHB categories.61 But if the prior system had been working
well, there would have been little reason for Congress to legislate EHB
requirements. HHS identified three of the ten EHB categories for which
coverage varied considerably among plans and markets prior to the EHB
requirement and that pose potential implementation challenges: mental
56. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.100(a) (2014).
57. Id. § 156.100(c).
58. See id. § 156.110(b); see also id. § 156.110(c) (regarding supplementing default
benchmark plans).
59. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 5 (Feb. 17,
2012), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ehb-faq-508.pdf
[hereinafter EHB FAQ]; see 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(1) & (b). Plans may not make
substitutions to prescription drug benefits, however. See id. § 156.115(b)(1)(iii).
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(4); EHB FAQ, supra note 59, at 5. It is interesting to
note that although the thrust of the ACA's EHB provisions was to require coverage of a
core set of health care services, the implementing regulations exclude categories of
coverage from EHB. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(d). Specifically, "EHB may not include
routine non-pediatric dental services, routine non-pediatric eye exam services, long-
term/custodial nursing home care benefits, or non-medically necessary orthodontia .... "
Id. As discussed below, prescription drug benefits also have received special attention,
with the Secretary specifying what formulary is adequate for health plans required to
comply with EHB requirements.
61. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Essential Health Benefits
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health and substance use disorder services, pediatric oral and vision
services, and habilitative services.62
Although plans generally cover mental health and substance use
disorder services, HHS found that small-group plans tend to limit the
extent of this coverage.63 HHS found that it was unclear from summary
plan documents whether plans cover behavioral health treatment
("BHT"), which is part of EHB.64 It also found that, in general, BHT for
autism tended to be covered only when there was a corresponding state
mandate.6' As discussed in more detail below, HHS since has
promulgated regulations making clear that a health plan will not be
deemed to provide EHB unless the benefits it offers comply with the
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 ("MHPAEA").66
It will be important to monitor how plans are implementing this EHB
category, including the scope of coverage plans are providing and the
extent to which plan networks have the capacity to provide the care that
now is covered.67
Pediatric dental is another EHB category that presents challenging
implementation issues. The ACA singled out pediatric dental coverage
by requiring exchanges to permit limited scope dental benefit plans that
satisfy statutory requirements to be sold either as stand-alone dental
plans or in conjunction with qualified health plans ("QHPs").68 Although
stand-alone dental plans must comply with a number of QHP
certification standards, many of the ACA's consumer protection
provisions have been modified or deemed inapplicable to stand-alone
dental plans, such as rating rules and medical loss ratio requirements.69
62. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
BULLETIN, 5-6 (Dec. 16, 2011),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/essential-health-benefits-bulle




66. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 146.136).
67. See infra Part IV.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 155.1065(b); see
generally 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (defining qualified health plans).
69. See Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs, for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., to Issuers in the Federally Facilitated Marketplaces, at 31-32 (Mar. 14,
2014),https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/
2015-final-issuer-letter-3-14-2014.pdf, [hereinafter CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers]; Letter
from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
Issuers on Federally-facilitated and State Partnership Exchanges, at 29-33 (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/
2014_letter to issuers_04052013.pdf [hereinafter CMS, 2013 Letter to Issuers];
ANDREW SNYDER ET AL., NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, IMPROVING
INTEGRATION OF DENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES 11
(Apr. 2014).
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When a limited scope dental plan is available through an exchange, that
exchange may certify a plan that does not include pediatric dental
coverage as a QHP.70  But since the ACA requires exchange plans to
offer EHB coverage but does not require consumers to buy the full
panoply of EHB benefits through an exchange,7 exchange consumers
may forego purchasing the stand-alone plans that provide pediatric
coverage,72 which undermines the policy goal of expanding access to
pediatric dental coverage. Although such limited-scope dental plans are
subject to their own out-of-pocket cost-sharing limitations, 73 these out-
of-pocket cost-sharing amounts are not included in calculations for cost-
sharing subsidies,74 which heightens the risk that QHP purchasers will
bypass stand-alone dental plans. Moreover, if a state's second-lowest
cost silver plan does not include pediatric dental benefits, the cost of
dental coverage is not included in the calculation used to establish
advanced premium tax credits.75 It is not surprising, then, that a study by
the American Dental Association found that only 34 percent of federal
exchange health plans included pediatric dental benefits, and only 63,448
of the estimated six to eight million children eligible for coverage signed
up for stand-alone dental plans sold through the federal website in thirty-
six states.76 To ensure children receive this essential health benefit, as
Congress intended, it is critical to monitor and evaluate how the different
benefit designs for the pediatric dental benefit work in practice and what
regulatory options are available.77
HHS noted that there is uncertainty regarding what services are
included within the habilitative care EHB category.78 Prior to the ACA,
few plans identified services using this label, and there is no universally
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(F); 45 C.F.R. § 155.1065(d); see also N.J.A.C. §
11:20, Appx., Exhibit C (LexisNexis 2015) ("For policies sold on the Marketplace the
Dental Benefits provision may be excluded if the Marketplace offers a standalone dental
plan with a pediatric dental essential health benefit . .
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a).
72. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,853 (Feb.
25, 2013).
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.150(a).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(5); 45 C.F.R. § 156.440(b); SNYDER ET AL., supra note
69, at 5.
75. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 69, at 15.
76. See Marissa Evans, Many kids fall through gaps in dental care, USA TODAY,
May 17, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/17/kids-dental-
plans/9098439/.
77. See, e.g., Joe Touschner, Time for a Dental Check Up, GEORGETOWN CTR ON
HEALTH INS. REFORMS BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/time-for-a-
dental-check-up/.
78. EHB BULLETIN, supra note 62, at 11.
[Vol. 120:1
HEALTH INSURER MARKET BEHAVIOR
accepted definition of these services.79 Initially, while HHS wrestled
with how to define habilitative services, it implemented a transitional
policy that let states determine what services to include in their
benchmark plans for this EHB category.8° In states that did not define
habilitative services, issuers had a choice among two options.81  Plans
could offer habilitative services at parity with rehabilitative services "by
covering habilitative services benefits that are similar in scope, amount,
and duration to benefits covered for rehabilitative services."
82
Alternatively, issuers could define what constitutes habilitative services
and report the definition they employed to HHS, which would consider
the matter.
83
Noting that this transitional policy had not always "resulted in
comprehensive coverage for habilitative services," HHS adopted a
uniform definition of habilitative services in its Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016 Final Rule:
84
(a) Provision of EHB means that a health plan provides benefits
that...
(5) With respect to habilitative services and devices-
(i) Cover health care services and devices that help a person keep,
learn, or improve skills and functioning for daily living (habilitative
services). Examples include therapy for a child who is not walking or
talking at the expected age. These services may include physical and
occupational therapy, speech-language pathology and other services
for people with disabilities in a variety of inpatient and/or outpatient
settings;
(ii) Do not impose limits on coverage of habilitative services and
devices that are less favorable than any such limits imposed on
coverage of rehabilitative services and devices; and
79. See id. at 6.
80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,834-35
(Feb. 25, 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 156.1 10(f) (2014).
81. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. at 12,843-44.
82. 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(5)(i).
83. Id. § 156.115(a)(5)(ii).
84. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,811 (Feb. 27, 2015).
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(iii) For plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017, do not
impose combined limits on habilitative and rehabilitative services and
devices.
85
HHS also eliminated the provision that had permitted insurance
companies to determine the scope of habilitative services.86  States,
however, retain the ability "to determine services included in the
habilitative services and devices category if the base-benchmark plan
does not include coverage.,87 It will be important to assess whether this
definition furthers HHS's goal of minimizing "the variability in benefits
and lack of coverage for habilitative services.'88
There also has been debate over how HHS should implement the
prescription drug coverage EHB category. Initially, HHS intended to
permit a plan to select the specific drugs it would offer in its formulary as
long as the plan covered at least one drug in each category or class of
drugs included in the benchmark.89 This proposal sounded alarms for
some, like Professor Kenneth Thorpe, who described it as "unnecessarily
restrictive" and predicted it "would be catastrophic[,]" because
"[m]edicines are not interchangeable."90
When it initially finalized the rules, HHS required issuers to cover
"at least the greater of: (i) [o]ne drug in every United States
Pharmacopeia (USP) category and class; or (ii) [t]he same number of
85. 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(5); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,811.
("Habilitative services, including devices, are provided for a person to attain, maintain, or
prevent deterioration of a skill or function never learned or acquired due to a disabling
condition. Rehabilitative services, including devices, on the other hand, are provided to
help a person regain, maintain, or prevent deterioration of a skill or function that has been
acquired but then lost or impaired due to illness, injury, or disabling condition.").
86. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10, 811.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. EHB BULLETIN, supra note 62, at 12-13.
90. Kenneth Thorpe, Determining "Essential" Health Benefits, HILL'S CONGRESS
BLOG (June 20, 2012 5:46 P.M. EST), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blogihealthcare/233841-determining-essential-health-benefits; see also Colorado
Consumer Health Initiative, Comments on Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Data Collection to Support Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits; Recognition
of Entities for the Accreditation of Qualified Health Plans, at 3 (July 5, 2012),
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2012-0071 -
0036&attachmentNumber= l &disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (contending
that the Affordable Care Act requires that the EHB package be comparable to a typical
employer plan, which means that the EHB package will have to cover "a broad range of
drugs... within each category or class").
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prescription diugs in each category and class as the EHB-benchmark
plan. ' 91
In its Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016 Final
Rule, HHS implemented a number of revisions to its EHB prescription
drug coverage policy.92 While preserving the USP drug count standard,
the agency required plans beginning on or after January 1, 2017, to
establish a pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committee.93  The
regulation establishes a number of standards for the P&T committee,
including that it must:
Ensure the issuer's formulary drug list:
(1) Covers a range of drugs across a broad distribution of therapeutic
categories and classes and recommended drug treatment regimens
that treat all disease states, and does not discourage enrollment by
any group of enrollees; and
(2) Provides appropriate access to drugs that are included in broadly
accepted treatment guidelines and that are indicative of general best
practices at the time.
94
The P&T committee also is charged with reviewing "policies that
guide exceptions and other utilization management processes, including
drug utilization review, quantity limits, and therapeutic interchange," and
reviewing and approving "all clinical prior authorization criteria, step
therapy protocols, and quantity limit restrictions applied to each covered
drug.
95
HHS believes that the combination of a P&T committee and the
USP drug count standard will "ensure that the plan's formulary drug list
covers a sufficient number and type of prescription drugs.,96 States are
responsible to oversee and enforce P&T committee standards and the
USP drug count standard.97 HHS indicated that it may develop "tools
and resources to assist States in reviewing formulary drug lists."9 8 It is
critical to evaluate if HHS's revised policy provides consumers with
91. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(1) (2014). Health plans also must "have procedures
in place that allow an enrollee to request and gain access to clinically appropriate drugs
not covered by the health plan." Id. § 156.122(c).
92. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,813-19.
93. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(3).
94. Id. § 156.122(a)(3)(iii)(H).
95. Id. § 156.122(a)(3)(iii)(D)&(F).
96. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,813.
97. See id. at 10,814-15.
98. Id. at 10, 815.
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
access to medically appropriate prescription drug coverage as Congress
intended.99
Although the ACA prohibits annual and lifetime dollar limits on
EHB, 00 HHS is permitting such limits to "be converted to actuarially
equivalent treatment or service limits." 10 1 The American Academy of
Pediatrics has expressed concern that "the new EHB data collection
structure will not make it possible to verify the actuarial equivalence of
treatment limits, and in particular, non-quantitative limits," which "could
result in some plans using non-quantitative limits to reduce access to
benefits while still appearing to be actuarially equivalent to the
benchmark plan.,10 2 Timothy Jost similarly has warned that "[t]his will
substantially undermine the dollar limit prohibition."'' 0 3  Such
substitutions also make it more difficult for consumers to compare plans.
It is important to monitor if plans are introducing treatment or service
limits as a substitute for dollar limits on EHIB and, to the extent they are,
if there are ways to improve transparency for consumers.
Another interesting policy question is how HHS will decide to
handle the costs for state mandates that exceed the requirements of EHB
in QHPs. The ACA requires states to make payments to or on behalf of
individuals in QHPs to defray the costs of benefits required by state law
that are in addition to EHB. 104 To "accommodate[ ] current market
offerings and limit[ ] market disruption in the first years of the
Exchanges," HHS has adopted a transitional policy for at least plan years
2014-2016.105 Pursuant to HHS's policy, the agency will not consider a
state-required benefit that was enacted on or before December 31, 2011,
99. See, e.g., Part V(D)(1), infra (discussing prescription drug tiering).
100. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.126 (2014).
101. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID STUDIES, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PROPOSED STATE ESSENTIAL HEALTH
BENEFITS BENCHMARK PLANS, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-
Resources/ehb.html ( ast visited Aug. 8, 2014); see also EHB FAQ, supra note 59, at 4.
102. Letter from Robert W. Block, President, American Academy of Pediatrics, to
Marilyn A. Tavenner, Acting Administrator, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
at 2 (July 5, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0071-
0051.
103. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Essential Health Benefits And
Medical Loss Ratios, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 18. 2012),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/02/18/implementing-health-reform-essential-health-
benefits-and-medical-loss-ratios/.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B) (2012).
105. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.170(a)(2); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78
Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,838 (Feb. 25, 2013); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,813
(Feb. 27, 2015)
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to be in addition to the essential health benefits.10 6 It will be important
for states to monitor HHS's decision because, if HHS alters this policy,
states may need to make payments to defray the cost of mandated
benefits that go beyond the coverage required by EHB.
There also is some confusion surrounding what health services
qualify as preventive services. There have been reports that patients
have scheduled annual physicals, expecting them to be covered at one
hundred percent.1"7 But if patients report at these visits that they have
been experiencing headaches or that they are depressed, the visit may no
longer be considered preventive, which would trigger a copay from the
patient.0 8 Many patients, for example, have received bills for polyp
removal performed during screening colonoscopies, even though the
screening colonoscopy itself is a preventive health service that should be
covered without any cost-sharing.10 9 A study by Karen Pollitz and others
found inconsistent insurer definitions of what constitutes a covered
screening service as well as non-standard billing code practices of
insurers and providers.110 Although consumer and provider education
surely could help the situation, confusion may be inevitable, given that
what constitutes preventive health services is likely to evolve as new
research is conducted.
106. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.170(a)(2); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78
Fed. Reg. at 12,838; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of
Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,813 ("We did not propose
any changes to § 155.170. Therefore, only new State-required benefits enacted on or prior
to December 31, 2011 are included as EHB, and States are expected to continue to defray
the cost of State-required benefits enacted on or after January 1, 2012 unless those State-
required benefits were required in order to comply with new Federal requirements. HHS
intends to continue to publish a list of non-EHB State-required benefits on its Web site on
an annual basis."); id at 10,811-11 (explaining that States are not required to defray the
cost of State laws enacted to comply with the habilitative services EHB requirement
because "State laws enacted in order to comply with § 156.110(f) are not considered
benefits in addition to the EHB; such laws ensure compliance with § 156.110(a) which
requires coverage of all EHB categories"),
107. See Melinda Beck, Discord Over What to Pay the Doctor, WALL ST. J. ONLINE




109. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs - Set 12, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca-implementation
_faqsl2.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
110. See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., COVERAGE OF COLONOSCOPIES UNDER THE
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Although EHB requirements partially respond to contract
exclusions, they do not eliminate them. Indeed, health insurance
contracts continue to contain exclusions. HealthPocket found that the ten
most commonly excluded medical services in individual market plans in
2014 were: long-term care (99 percent), cosmetic surgery (92 percent),
adult dental services (89 percent), weight loss programs (88 percent),
acupuncture (84 percent), routine foot care (72 percent), infertility
treatment (67 percent), private nursing (67 percent), adult eye exams (61
percent), and weight loss surgery (59 percent)."' Interestingly, 80
percent of these services also were in the top ten list of exclusions in
2013, before the EHB requirements went into effect-children's
eyeglasses and children's dental checkups dropped off the list, making
room for routine foot care and adult eye exams to join.' 12 Although most
excluded services continue to be excluded post-EHB, the study noted
that weight loss programs dropped from being excluded by 93 percent of
the plans in 2013 to 88 percent in 2014, that weight loss surgery had
been excluded by 90 percent and now was excluded by only 59 percent
of plans, and that infertility treatment went from being excluded by 94
percent down to 66 percent of health plans."3 It is important to monitor
contract exclusions as well as potential blurred lines between covered
and excluded categories of care to assess if greater clarity is needed
regarding the boundaries of each to minimize consumer confusion.
Underlying each of these issues is the persistent need, as HHS has
recognized, "to balance comprehensiveness, affordability, and State
flexibility." ' 14 In February 2015, HHS announced that it will continue to
use the benchmark process to determine EHBs through plan year 2017
because this approach is the most appropriate way to "[m]aintain State
flexibility while ensuring comprehensive coverage."' 15 The agency will
be examining "how the policy affected enrollees and what changes, if
any, should be made in the future."' 1 6 States, too, should evaluate their
regulatory options.'li
7
111. See Top 10 Healthcare Services Excluded Under Obamacare,




114. EHB BULLETIN, supra note 62, at 1.
115. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,813 (Feb. 27, 2015).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., JUSTrN GIOVANNELLI ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: STATE ACTION TO REFORM THE INDIvIDUAL
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET (July 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files /publications/issue-
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III. UTILIZATION REVIEW AND "MEDICAL NECESSITY" JUDGMENTS
As discussed in the prior section, insurance contracts broadly cover
a wide range of services such as hospitalization, physician services,
pharmaceuticals, and diagnostic technologies.'8 Within those broad
categories of coverage, however, insurance contracts invariably limit
care to that which is "medically necessary."' 19 Once a person is insured,
and that insurance covers particular services essential to the person's
health, disputes may arise over whether a covered service is medically
necessary in the situation in which the person finds herself. The ACA
builds on prior law to improve the processes by which medical necessity
decisions are made.
There is no straight-forward, generally accepted efinition of
medical necessity.1 20 An insurer's refusal to pay for services on medical
necessity grounds connotes a judgment that the treatment is not, in the
case at hand, medically appropriate. 121 The leading insurance treatise
summarizes the contractual bases for medical necessity denials as
follows:
The insurer may ... delineate criteria for determining what is
medically necessary in the policy. For example, a policy may define
a "medically necessary" treatment as one which is (1) required and
appropriate for care of the sickness or the injury, (2) given in
accordance with generally accepted principles of medical practice in
the United States at the time furnished, (3) approved for
reimbursement by the Health Care Financing Administration [now
CMS], (4) not deemed experimental, educational, or investigational
in nature by any appropriate technological assessment body
brief/2014/jul/1758_giovannelliimplementing_aca statereform
_individualmarketrb.pdf (examining where states have flexibility to enact consumer
protections that exceed federal minimum requirements).
118. See supra Part II.A-B.
119. See Sage, supra note 9, at 605-06 (describing the history and function of
"medical necessity" determinations in health insurance contracts).
120. See, e.g., ULMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 95 (declining to articulate a
definition for medical necessity, instead deferring to industry practice: "Medical
necessity is a condition of benefit coverage usually found in insurance contracts, allowing
health insurers to review the appropriateness of any intervention a patient receives");
Sage, supra note 9, at 601-02; Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Henderson, Health Insurers'
Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1646-48 (1992).
121. This suggested working definition of "medical necessity" is not intended to
paper over the fact that the term is used in many ways in many circumstances. Professor
William Sage has reported on a Stanford University study that asked plan decision-
makers to distinguish between a "'medical necessity decision' and a 'coverage decision"'
found that there was a wide range of responses. Sage, supra note 9, at 603-04.
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established by any state or federal government, and (5) not furnished
in connection with medical or other research.
122
None of those categories provides a bright-line interpretive
standard. Medical necessity review permits health insurers a contractual
mechanism for reviewing some123 cases prior to approval ("prospective
review") or after treatment ("retrospective review") to exclude coverage
for treatment that is beyond the terms of the contractual agreement, as
the insurer interprets it.
Contract language can be more clearly specified on what services
are covered and which are excluded, so that the insureds can more fully
understand the nature of their bargain when they purchase particular
health insurance coverage.124 The infinite complexity of human medical
conditions and the range of possible treatments, however, guarantee that
no contractual language can resolve all disputes. Interpretive disputes
can arise regardless of the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of the
contractual drafting process.
Attempts to articulate principles to guide medical necessity
judgments have focused on several principles. First, a touchstone for
interpretation has been customary medical practice.125  Second, the
treatment sought must be "effective" in treating illness or injury. 26
Third, it must not be provided merely "as a convenience to the patient or
provider.'' 127 These principles are intended to rule out coverage in cases
where treatment is simply outside accepted professional norms, not
matched to the underlying health condition such that its provision is
calculated to provide medical benefit, or predominantly a social amenity
rather than a health care treatment.
Medical necessity clauses, then, can serve the salutary purpose of
setting out a boundary around insurance coverage, permitting principled
limits to insurers' financial exposure.128  Their use can also be
problematic, as the, inherent indeterminacy of medical necessity
judgments can leave both insurer and insured uncertain of their rights
122. STEVEN PLITr ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 181:2 (3D ED. 2013) (citations
omitted).
123. Hall and Henderson report that resort to medical necessity denials comprises a
small percentage of claims - "only one to two percent." Hall & Henderson, supra note
120, at 1654 (citing INST. OF MED., CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE?
THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 4, 77 (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field
eds., 1989)). See Part III(C)(1), infra.
124. See Part II, infra.
125. Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14 HEALTH AFF., Nov.
1995, at 180, 182.
126. Id. at 182-83.
127. Id.
128. Hall & Henderson, supra note 120, at 1653-54.
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and obligations.129 Treatments seen by some as speculative experiments
can be seen by others as proper cutting-edge care. Treatment with little
predicted efficacy might be seen in a more favorable light in cases of
grave illness that is unresponsive to other therapies.3 ° There is even a
risk, as described below, that the indeterminacy of medical necessity
judgments could permit disparate treatment of vulnerable groups.131
Some uncertainty is sure to remain, regardless of attempts to narrow
its range.1 32 Take, for example, the case of an item of durable medical
equipment. Some consumers with mobility impairments benefit from the
use of "power operated vehicles," or scooters, to go about their daily
lives. Disputes can arise, however, over whether the scooter is
"medically necessary" or a "convenience" item.'33  No amount of
contractual language refinement can avoid differing, plausible
interpretations of coverage in all such cases. Dispute resolution
procedures therefore are necessary.1
3 4
A. Dispute Resolution Procedures
Civil litigation has been the historic resolution procedure for
medical necessity disputes. The litigation can be premised on state
contract law theories, in which courts are asked to settle disputes over
insurers' contractual obligations.35 Where coverage is an incident of
employment, ERISA, a federal statute governing employee benefits,
usually shifts the legal focus from state contract law to federal law.
136
129. Sage, supra note 9, at 601-02; Bergthold, supra note 125, at 186-87.
130. Sara J. Singer & Linda A. Bergthold, from the Stanford Center for Health
Policy, conducted a series of interviews of medical directors of managed care plans over
a decade ago to investigate the means by which these directors made medical necessity
judgments. They discovered that the contractual language did not drive their decision-
making process to the extent contract drafters might hope. Sara J. Singer & Linda A.
Bergthold, Prospects For Improved Decision Making About Medical Necessity, 20
HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2001, at 200, 202.
131. See infra Part V.
132. See Sage, supra note 9, at 598-99.
133. See Lisa Iezzoni, Boundaries: What happens to the disabled poor when insurers
draw a line between what's "medically necessary" and devices that can improve quality
of life?, 18 HEALTH AFF., Nov. 1999, at 171, 174.
134. See HUSKY HEALTH CONNECTICUT, HUSKY Health Wheeled Mobility Letter of
Medical Necessity Form (May 1, 2015), http://www.huskyhealthct.org/providers/
provider-postings/policies-procedures/wheeled-mobility/Wheeled Mobility-Device -Gu
idelineslnstructions.pdf (form provided by HUSKY Health, which houses Connecticut's
Medicaid program, for insureds to appeal medical necessity denials of motorized
scooters).
135. See Sage, supra note 9, at 610--11.
136. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). Most employment-based coverage is
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Whether litigation proceeds under state contract causes of action (usually
in state court) or under ERISA causes of action137 (usually in federal
court), a court's ultimate judgment typically will depend on fact-specific
analysis of the coverage requested and opposing opinions on the medical
necessity of that treatment.138 The litigation process has been criticized
as expensive and time-consuming, leading to inconsistent determinations
by lay judges and jurors. 
139
In the 1990s and 2000s, as part of the backlash against managed
care, consumers pushed back against medical denials by plans.
140
Federal and state regulators supplemented the expensive and lengthy
litigation process with more accessible and timely processes of internal
and external appeals.141 The internal appeals processes commonly came
to have two stages, with the first stage consisting of review by a plan
physician not involved in the initial medical denial, and the second stage
consisting of another internal appeal, this time to a committee
comprising clinicians, non-clinical plan employees, and in some cases,
community representatives.142 To the extent plans had not been required
by preexisting state law to provide internal review processes, the ACA
now requires, as a matter of federal law, non-grandfathered plans to offer
internal appeals.
143
Skepticism of insurers' internal review of medical necessity denials
led many states to implement an external "independent utilization
review" process that permitted the insureds to seek review of denials
affected by ERISA and its preemption provisions. Coverage not affected by ERISA
includes individually-purchased coverage, public benefits (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid),
and employment-based benefits for government employers and some church
organizations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1002.
137. ERISA preemption bars state-law contract actions for most employment-based
coverage disputes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1144. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 55 (1987). Most Americans with private insurance have it as an incident of
employment. See HUBERT JANICKI, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,EMPLOYMENT-
BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: 2010 1 (Feb. 2013).
138. SeePLITT ET AL., supra note 122, § 181:2.
139. See generally Sage, supra note 9; Hall & Henderson, supra note 120.
140. See James C. Robinson and Jill M. Yegian, Medical Management After
Managed Care, HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE), May 2004, at W4-269, W4-269,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/05/19/hlthaff.w4.269.full.pdf; James
Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2622 (2001).
141. See Gresenz et al., Patients in Conflict with Managed Care: A Profile of
Appeals in Two HMOs, 21 HEALTH AFF. July 2002, at 189, 189; Susan J. Stayn, Note,
Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform
Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLIUM. L. REv. 1674, 1702-06 (1994).
142. See Aaron Seth Kesselheim, Comment, What's the Appeal? Trying to Control
Managed Care Medical Necessity Decisionmaking Through a System of External
Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 873, 884-85 (1992).
143. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.136(a)-(b) (2014).
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from panels of independent, suitably qualified physicians.'44 These
private independent utilization review organizations ("IUROs") "contract
with states [and/or] private health plans ... to conduct external reviews.
These organizations in turn contract with practicing physicians from
many specialties who agree to be available to review cases.'45 Although
prior to the ACA, most plans subject to state regulation were required to
provide independent external appeals as a matter of state law, 146 the ACA
requires that all non-grandfathered individual and group health insurance
plans provide external review as a matter of federal law. 147
Independent review processes have been increasingly favored over
private litigation and internal review processes for several reasons. First,
they shift clinical judgment from plan employees to independent clinical
reviewers, thereby addressing concerns about decision-maker conflicts of
interest. 148 Second, they are less formal, less expensive, and less time-
consuming than litigation in state or federal courts.49 Third, they place
decision-making authority over largely clinical decisions in the hands of
specialized physicians, and not lay judges or juries, thereby permitting
the application of clinical expertise to medical necessity judgments.50
Internal and external review procedures are not, of course,
panaceas. Internal review provides an opportunity for reconsideration of
plans' decisions and allows for a fuller consideration of the
appropriateness of the circumstances surrounding the requested
treatment.15 1 Internal review, however, can be opaque and subject to
conflicts of interest.
152
Independent review process can correct the structural conflicts of
interest to which internal appeals are subject without entailing the cost
and delays inherent in litigation.' 3 States have attempted to strike a
balance between consumer-friendly, simple processes and procedures
ensuring sound decision-making. These goals have been impeded in
144. Id.
145. GERALDINE DALLEK & KAREN POLLITZ, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
EXTERNAL REVIEW OF HEALTH PLAN DECISIONS: AN UPDATE 8 (May 2000)
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01 /extemal-review.pdf.
146. See id.
147. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.136(d) (setting out requirements for external review for
non-grandfathered self-funded plans governed by ERISA); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
TECHNICAL RELEASE No. 2011-02 (June 22, 2011) (providing further standards for
external review for non-grandfathered plans governed by ERISA),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa /newsroom/trl 1-02.html#fl2.
148. See Kesselheim, supra note 142, at 886.
149. See Sage, supra note 9, at 620.
150. See id.; Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 189.
151. See Kesselheim, supra note 142, at 883.
152. See id. at 884-85.
153. See Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 189-90.
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some instances by continued shortcomings: (1) it is sometimes subject
to shorter filing deadlines than are civil actions in courts;5 4 (2) it requires
exhaustion of often multi-level internal appeals (with exceptions or
expedited processes for emergency cases);155 (3) while the independent
review process is simpler than litigation, it nevertheless can be time-
consuming, as the patients and their health care providers must gather
and submit medical records and other information in support of the
review;156 (4) few sources of assistance exist for patients pursuing the
process;157 and (5) "medical necessity" remains a murky concept during
the process, and even conflict-free expert physicians can disagree on its
definition in any case."'
B. The Numbers: Denials, Appeals, Reversals
Medical necessity judgments attempt to determine whether
insurance resources should be expended on care in particular contexts in
which the application of coverage terms to a patient's condition is
contestable.159 There apparently are no data sources gathering insurance
companies' or plan administrators' denial rates.60 RAND Corporation
researchers examined past studies and found indications of enormous
numbers of claims denials.161 They reviewed reports from the American
Medical Association and an electronic billing service, which disclosed
plan-specific rates of denials ranging from one percent to fifteen percent
for private insurers, with even higher rates in Medicaid plans.162 These
154. See DALLEK & POLLITZ, supra note 145, at 5.
155. See Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal
Remedies to Achieve Managed Care Accountability, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 233, 247-49
(2004); DALLEK & POLLITZ, supra note 145, at 4.
156. See DALLEK & POLLITZ, supra note 145, at 4-6.
157. The ACA contemplated the creation in each state of offices of insurance
ombudsman and Consumer Assistance Programs ("CAPs") with the purpose, inter alia,
of assisting consumers in the filing of internal and external appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
93(c) (2012). Lack of state take-up and shortfalls in funding, however, have limited these
programs. As of August 10, 2014, there are only twelve federally funded CAP programs
operating in nine states, the District of Columbia, and two territories. See CTR. FOR
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
Consumer Assistance Program, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Consumer-
Assistance-Grants/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
158. See Berman-Sandler, supra note 155, at 247-49; DALLEK & POLLITZ, supra note
145, at 4-6.
159. See Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care Costs: Independent
Medical Review after "Obamacare", 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 255,274 (2011).
160. SeeCHRISTINE EIBNER ET AL., EMPLOYER SELF-INSURANCE DECISIONS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AS MODIFIED BY
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raw numbers reveal little about the effect of disputes over medical
necessity, as they gather denials of many sorts, including those based on
documentation errors, patient ineligibility for coverage, failure to obtain
pre-authorization, and medical necessity disputes.1
63
Attempts to tease out the rates of medical necessity denials and
appeals have been few. Professors Hall and Anderson in 1992 relied on
a 1989 IOM report to estimate the rate of medical necessity denials at
"one to two percent."'64  Researchers from the RAND Corporation
subsequently provided more detailed information about denial rates
through interviews of plan decision-makers and review of administrative
documents.165 The researchers found that these sources reported overall
denial rates of six percent for prospective coverage requests and twenty-
three percent for retrospective requests.166 The researchers also found
that very few of the retrospective denials were on medical necessity
grounds, while twenty-nine percent of the prospective denials were on
the ground that the care was not medically necessary.
167
Using a different, larger data set, RAND Corporation researchers
also were able to review what happened next: what were the results of
appeals from those denials of coverage?68 These researchers had access
to the internal appeals records kept by two California HMOs, with
combined enrollment of "several million commercial HMO enrollees."'
69
The HMOs had slightly different internal appeals processes. One had a
two-step, and the other a three-step internal appeals process.7 ° The rates
of appeal "were virtually identical at the two plans, with approximately
3.5 [appeals] per thousand enrollees per year."' 71 Approximately 70
percent of the appeals from one of the plans were from prospective
denials.72 Forty-nine percent of those prospective denials were medical
necessity denials, for a rate of approximately 1.2 appeals from medical
necessity denials per thousand enrollees per year.173 The internal appeals
163. Id at 32-33.
164. Hall & Henderson, supra note 120, at 1654.
165. See Kanika Kapur et al., Managing Care: Utilization Review In Action At Two
Capitated Medical Groups, HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE), June 2003, at W3-275, W3-
276, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/06/18/hlthaff.w3.275 .fill.
pdf+html; Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 190.
166. Kapur et al., supra note 165, at W3-279.
167. Id.
168. Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 190.
169. Id.
170. Id at 191.
171. Id
172. Id.
173. Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 191, 193.
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process favored the enrollee and resulted in a reversal of the original
denial in 70.3 percent of cases.
174
C. The Significance and Instrumental Use of Medical Necessity Review
Consumers and health care providers often feel that medical
necessity denials represent the imposition of non-clinical decision-
makers into what should be a therapeutic setting.175 The truth is more
complicated. Most or all final decisions denying coverage on medical
necessity grounds are made by health care professionals with credentials
appropriate to the task.176 Review of medical claims by insurers serves
valuable functions. If a requested treatment is indeed not "medically
necessary," its provision is at least a waste of scarce funds and at worst a
threat to the health of the insured.177  But given the inescapable
indeterminacy of the term "medical necessity," leaving the review of
claims for medical necessity exclusively to health plans leaves open the
possibility of mistake or abuse.
178
Medical necessity disputes can reveal situations directly applying
this balance between prudent administration of health plans and
assurance that the plans deliver on their obligations to connect their
insureds with medically appropriate care. The somewhat scant data
available on appeals suggest that further investigation may be helpful in
several ways.
First, public dissemination of analysis of medical necessity review
can address a perception that plan decision-making and review is
inconsistent and unprincipled. Reviewing and analyzing denials and
appeals processes can provide a "common law" of medical necessity,
providing a basis for judging plan decision-making.179 Enhancing and
reinforcing legitimacy in this process is critically important to the
success of the ACA. Such legitimacy is proof against both inadvertent
error that can harm insureds medically and invidious manipulation of the
medical necessity judgment that can be harmful at a deeper level. As
Professor Daniel Skinner has observed:
[M]edical necessity constitutes a more case- or condition- specific
concept than benefits, a difference that suggests a key challenge for
ACA implementation concerning medical necessity decision-making:
174. Id. at 192.
175. See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability
in Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 93, 99 (2006).
176. See Singer & Bergthold, supra note 130, at 201.
177. See Sage, supra note 9, at 605-06.
178. See Bergthold, supra note 125, at 185-86.
179. See Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 194.
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how to ensure that the ACA's antidiscrimination protections for
benefits are extended to the level of the more variable concept of
medical necessity. "Flexibility," in other words, poses a potential
problem when it leads to unfair or inconsistent practices in
determining medical necessity.
80
Second, a consistent and publicly reported process serves a sentinel
effect. As the somewhat scant literature described above suggests,
medical denials and the results of internal appeals by plans vary quite a
bit, without obvious explanation.18" ' Examination of the insureds'
experience in medical necessity situations-both on initial denial and on
review-could provide valuable information about the friction points in
coverage and suggest means for improving understanding of health
plans' decision-making in the reformed marketplace. This review could
discover which plans are interpreting common clinical evidence more or
less stringently, and a broader analysis could disclose the relative validity
of differing interpretations. This information could be of use to
regulators directly, as they assess the market behavior of plans, and, in
addition, the information could help inform consumers as they choose
health plans.
Finally, attention to medical necessity decision and appeals
processes can help to understand the extent to which medical necessity
determinations are harming patients. The data on the rate of medical
necessity denials is sketchy, as has been described.1 82 If the
inconvenience of pursuing appeals or other inhibitions stifle the
expression of dissatisfaction, then the magnitude of the problem could be
greater than previously described. Examining the scope of the problem
could be helpful to regulators. If the true number of disputes is relatively
small, then the regulatory process likely is working well and may require
little adjustment. If it appears that the number of medical necessity
disputes is relatively large, then more regulatory attention may be called
for. Better information can permit an inquiry into the "epidemiology" of
the medical necessity question, permitting examination of who appeals,
who does not, and why.
1 83
IV. RESTRICTED PROVIDER NETWORKS
Without an adequate supply of qualified and available health care
providers, consumers cannot access appropriate care. Most health plans
180. See Daniel Skinner, Defining Medical Necessity under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 73 PUB. ADMIN. R. 49, 51 (2013); see Part V, infra.
181. See Singer & Bergthold, supra note 130, at 201.
182. See EIBNER ET AL., supra note 160, at 32-33.
183. See Gresenz et al., supra note 141, at 194.
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today maintain a network of health care providers and either limit their
members to in-network providers or require substantial out-of-pocket
payments for access to out-of-network providers.184 In recent years, the
breadth of these networks has waxed and waned. In the 1980s and early
1990s, narrow provider-network HMOs competed with broader plans.
185
After a consumer backlash against perceived restrictions on access to
care, HMOs turned away from narrow network models.186 At the same
time, non-HMO insurers were creating networks of their own, blurring
the lines between HMOs and other forms of coverage.187 On one hand,
few plans maintained narrow networks. On the other hand, most plans
did maintain a defined panel of in-network providers, which the insureds
were either limited to or strongly incented to use.188
Narrow networks8 9 offer several benefits. Narrowing networks
gives plans the ability to bargain to pay providers less, because the
narrower a plan's network is, the more of the plan's enrollees a
participating provider can expect to serve.190 Plans can then pass on their
savings from paying providers less to enrollees in the form of lower
premiums.191 In addition, selective contracting can allow insurers to
include providers with a proven record of high-quality care and to favor
providers able to shift to new models of patient-centered care
184. See How to Choose Marketplace Insurance: How to Keep Your Doctor,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/keep-your-doctor/ (last
visited Aug. 9, 2015); AHIP FOUNDATION, A CONSUMER GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
HEALTH PLAN NETWORKS 12 (2014), http://www.ahipfoundation.org/Interactive-
Consumer-Guide.pdf; see also NOAM BAUMAN ET AL., McKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH
SYSTEM REFORM, HOSPITAL NETWORKS: EVOLUTION OF THE CONFIGURATIONS ON THE 2015
EXCHANGES (Apr. 2015),
http://healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/2015HospitalNetworks.pdf.
185. See SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., CTR. ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS, GEORGETOWN
UNIV., NARROW PROVIDER NETWORKS IN NEW HEATH PLANS: BALANCING AFFORDABILITY
WITH ACCESS TO QUALITY CARE 2 (May 29, 2014).
186. See id.; Marc A. Rodwin, The Metamorphosis of Managed Care: Implications
for Health Reform Internationally, 38 J. LAW, MED., & ETHICS 352, 353 (2010).
187. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 185, at 6; Rodwin, supra note 186, at 357-58.
188. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 185, at 2; Rodwin, supra note 186, at 357-58.
189. For these purposes, the term "narrow networks" is intended to include plans that
limit coverage to a discrete, selective group of providers, and plans that "tier" their
providers, covering selected providers with low cost-share for insureds, and other
providers at increased cost-share for insureds. See James C. Robinson, Hospital Tiers In
Health Insurance: Balancing Consumer Choice With Financial Motives, HEALTH AFF.
(WEB EXCLUSIVE), Mar. 2003 at w3-35, W3-36,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/ 2003/03/19/hlthaff.w3.135.citation
190. See James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era,
291 JAMA 1880, 1882 (2004).
191. See id. Note that the increasing concentration of providers in consolidated
business models weakens insurers' bargaining position. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra
note185, at 3.
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management, which is particularly important for high-needs insureds
with chronic illnesses.
192
Narrow networks and tiered networks also can present risks. First,
narrow networks may impose significant financial hardship due to
unavailability of care.193  Care might be unavailable if in-network
providers are not geographically proximate to the insured, are not taking
appointments within a medically reasonable time, or if no network
provider is qualified to provide particular medically-necessary care.194
Resort to out-of-network or higher-tier providers may leave the insured
responsible for paying substantial out-of-pocket costs. 95 As HHS has
explained, "balance billing amounts for non-network providers and other
out-of-network cost-sharing" will not count toward the insured's out-of-
pocket maximum.196 Second, the unavailability of in-network providers
may lead to health degradation if the insured does not have the resources
to pay for out-of-network care. 97
Issues of network adequacy have reemerged with the
implementation of the ACA. As plans attempt to meet ACA
requirements while restraining premiums, many have offered products
with narrow provider networks'98 and tiered networks.199 The costs and
192. See Sabrina Corlette, State Insurance Exchanges Face Challenges In Offering
Standardized Choices Alongside Innovative Value-Based Insurance, 32 HEALTH AFF.,
Feb. 2013, at 418, 419; James C. Robinson, Applying Value-Based Insurance Design To
High-Cost Health Services, 29 HEALTH AFF., Nov. 2014, at 2009, 2010.
[hereinafter Robinson, Applying Value-Based Insurance Design To High-Cost
Health Services].
193. See Tracy Jan, UnitedHealthcare to cut doctors for Mass. Seniors, BOSTON
GLOBE (June 7, 2014); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Concerns about Cancer Centers under
Health Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.utsandiego.con/
news/2014/Mar/i 8/concerns-about-cancer-centers-under-health-law/.
194. Id.
195. See Robinson, Applying Value-Based Insurance Design To High-Cost Health
Services, supra note 192, at 2010.
196. See Out-of-pocket Maximum Limit, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.
gov/glossary/out-of-pocket-maximum-limit/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
197. See Robinson, Applying Value-Based Insurance Design To High-Cost Health
Services, supra note 192, at 2010.
198. See McKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM, HOSPITAL NETWORKS:
UPDATED NATIONAL VIEW OF CONFIGURATIONS ON THE EXCHANGES 1 (June 2014),
[hereinafter McKINSEY CTR., UPDATED NATIONAL VIEW].
199. As Paul Ginsburg has described, plans using "tiered networks":
sort network providers into tiers according to the insurer's assessment of costs
and quality and then vary the deductible or other elements of patients' cost
sharing by tier. This approach could potentially shift care to less costly
providers and induce the more costly ones to become more efficient.
Paul B. Ginsburg, Reforming Provider Payment - The Price Side of the Equation,
365 NEWENG. J. MED. 1268,1268-69 (2001).
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benefits of these plan designs will require thoughtful regulatory
responses.
A. Regulating Network Adequacy
Regulators have experimented with consumer protection measures
to mitigate the potential risks of narrow or tiered networks. Before the
passage of the ACA in 2010, the federal government did not regulate the
network adequacy of individual and small-group plans,200 deferring
instead to the states as the primary regulators of private health
insurance.20' Prior to the ACA, nearly all states had adopted network
adequacy standards for HMOs and approximately half of the states had
standards for preferred provider organizations ("PPOs").20 2 Most states
employ broad, subjective standards, such as requiring "reasonable
access" to providers.,20 3 Some states have opted for quantitative
standards, including establishing provider-to-enrollee ratios and
maximum travel times, travel distances, and appointment wait times, as
well as requiring a minimum number of providers who are accepting new
patients and who are available in a given service area.204 A handful of
states, such as California and Connecticut, include standards regarding
access to essential community providers, who serve low-income and
medically underserved individuals.205  The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") also developed a model law, the
Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model Act #74, which
recommends that state regulation address:
200. The federal government does regulate network adequacy in public programs,
including Medicare Advantage and Medicaid Managed Care plans. See Quynh Chi
Nguyen, Network Adequacy: What Advocates Need to Know, COMMUNITY CATALYST, 3
(Jan. 2014), http ://www. communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/
Network-Adequacywhat-advocates-need-to-knowFINAL-01-28-14.pdf; Jean A. Talbot
et al., Rural Considerations in Establishing Network Adequacy Standards for Qualified
Health Plans in State and Regional Health Insurance Exchanges, 29 J. OF RURAL HEALTH
327, 329-30 (2013).
201. HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., ENSURING CONSUMERS' ACCESS TO CARE: NETWORK
ADEQUACY STATE INSURANCE SURVEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REGULATORY REFORMS IN A CHANGING INSURANCE MARKET 5 (Nov. 2014),
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees conliaison-networkadequacyreport.pdf.
202. See MCKINSEY CTR., UPDATED NATIONAL VIEW, supra note 198, at 1.
203. See LAURA SPICER ET AL., MD. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE (MHBE) STANDING
ADVISORY COMM., HILLTOP INST., NETWORK ADEQUACY AND ESSENTIAL COMMUNITY
PROVIDERS 13-14, (Jul. 9, 2014); see also Nguyen, supra note 200, at 2 ("Most states
have broad standards requiring health plans in the private insurance market to have a
'robust' or 'sufficient' market.").
204. See SPICER ET AL., supra note 203, at 13-14.
205. Id. at 3, 17.
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maximum number of enrollees per primary care and specialty
providers[;]
geographic accessibility[;]
waiting times for appointments with participating providers[;]
hours of operation[; and]
volume of technological and specialty services available to serve the
needs of covered persons requiring advanced technology or specialty
care[.]
206
The ACA, for the first time, created federal oversight of network
adequacy, although only for QHPs. The ACA opts for a broad standard
and left the states with considerable flexibility to determine how to
regulate QHP networks.2 °7 The ACA requires the Secretary of HHS to
promulgate regulations establishing standards for the certification of
health plans as QHPs that would, among other things, "ensure sufficient
choice of providers... and provide information to enrollees and
prospective enrollees on the availability of in-network and out-of-
network providers[.],,2°8 The statute also requires plans to include
Essential Community Providers ("ECPs") within plan networks, where
available, "that serve predominately low-income, medically-underserved
individuals.,
20 9
For a health plan to be certified as a QHP and thus be eligible to be
sold on the exchanges, the regulations implementing the ACA's statutory
commands require issuers to "[m]aintain[] a network that is sufficient in
number and types of providers, including [those] that specialize in
mental health and substance abuse services, to assure that all services
will be available without unreasonable delay.
' 210
Issuers also must ensure that the network for each of their QHPs
includes "a sufficient number and geographic distribution of essential
community providers [ECPs], where available, to ensure reasonable and
timely access to a broad range of such providers."21' Through guidance
206. Nguyen, supra note 200, at 2; see also NAT'L AssOC'N OF INS. COMM'RS,
MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT #74 (Oct. 1996); SALLY
MCCARTY & MAX FARRIS, STATE HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE NETWORK, ACA
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS (Aug. 2013) (comparing
network adequacy requirements set forth in the NAIC Network Adequacy Model Act, the
ACA and its implementing regulations and guidance, and ten states' laws).
207. HEALTH MGMT. ASsocs., supra note 201, at 10.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1803 1(c)(1)(B) (2012).
209. Id. § 18031(c)(1)(C).
210. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2014).
211. Id. § 156.235(a)(1); see also id. § 156.230(a)(1). The ACA's implementing
regulations also provide an alternate ECP standard for "[a] QHP issuer that provides a
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issued in 2013, CMS created a safe harbor for QHP applications that
demonstrated the participation of at least 20 percent of available ECPs in
the service area, all available Indian providers in the service area, and at
least one ECP in each ECP category in each county in the service area,
where available.1 2 QHP applicants that did not meet the safe harbor, but
had at least ten percent of available ECPs in the plan service area, could
submit a narrative justification describing how their networks provided
an adequate level of service for low-income and medically underserved
consumers.213 Applicants who satisfied neither the safe harbor nor the
ten percent minimum expectation could submit a narrative justification
describing how their current network would provide access and how they
planned to increase ECP participation in the future.214
In addition, QHP issuers must provide the exchange with their
network provider directory to be published online and provide hard
copies of directories to potential enrollees when requested.215 The
provider directory must indicate if a provider is not accepting new
216patients. Through guidance, CMS indicated to issuers that it expects
directories "to include location, contact information, specialty and
medical group, and any institutional affiliations for each provider," and
encouraged issuers to include information such as "languages spoken,
provider credentials, and whether the provider is an Indian provider.
2 17
The agency, however, did not initially issue guidance regarding how
frequently directories need to be updated.218
Neither the federal statute nor regulations define key terms, like
"unreasonable delay," instead "leaving the implementation of specific
standards either to insurers or to the states.,,219 For the 2014 plan year,
"[i]n states with sufficient network adequacy reviews," CMS relied on
state analyses and recommendations concerning network adequacy as
majority of covered professional services through physicians employed by the issuer or
through a single contracted medical group." Id. §§ 156.235(a)(2), (b).
212. CMS, 2013 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 7.
213. See id
214. Id. at 7-8.
215. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(b).
216. Id.
217. CMS, 2013 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 46. Interestingly, despite the
regulatory requirement that issuers indicate in directories that providers are not taking
new patients, see 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(b), the regulatory guidance only encouraged
issuers to do so; see CMS, 2013 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 46.
218. See McCARTY & FARRIS, supra note 206, at 2.
219. Nguyen, supra note 200, at 1; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act: Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for
Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,419 (Mar. 27, 2012).
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part of the federal QHP certification evaluation process.20 CMS also
indicated that it would monitor network adequacy by, for example,
tracking complaints and gathering data from QHP issuers.22'
B. Post-ACA Network Adequacy Experiences
Strategies insurers are using to keep premiums in check while
complying with the ACA's coverage and rating requirements frequently
include reconfiguring, narrowing, and tiering their networks.22
According to a survey of hospital networks available on the exchanges in
2014, 92 percent of all people eligible to buy QHPs on the exchanges
nationally could have chosen a plan with a narrow network of
participating hospitals.223 In 2014, narrow hospital networks comprised
48 percent of all exchange plan networks in the United States and 60
percent of exchange plan networks available in the largest city in each
state. 224  A recent follow-up study that analyzed hospital networks
available on the exchanges in 2015 similarly found, among other things,
that "the proportion of narrowed networks and their relative narrowness
has not changed.,225  Narrowed or tiered plans generally offered
consumers a lower premium in exchange for a smaller network of
hospitals or providers than consumers would find in traditional
networks.226 By limiting the doctors or hospitals available to patients,
insurers hope to keep costs down.
220. CMS, 2013 Letter to issuers, supra note 69, at 6. CMS relied on issuer
accreditation in states that lacked sufficient network adequacy reviews. See id.
221. See id.
222. See David Blumenthal, M.D., M.P.P. & Sara R. Collins, Ph.D., Health
Coverage under the Affordable Care Act - A Progress Report, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 275,
278 (2014); Harold Brubaker, Blue Cross offers guides to health-care 'tiers', PILA.
INQUIRER (Oct. 7, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-10-07/business/42766201 1 ibc-
insurance-exchange-amerihealth-new-jersey; David Cusano & Amy Thomas, Narrow
Networks Under the ACA: Financial Drivers And Implementation Strategies, HEALTH
AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 17, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/17/narrow-
networks-under-the-aca-financial-drivers-and-implementation-strategies/
223. See McKINSEY CTR., UPDATED NATIONAL View, supra note 198, at 2, n.6.
224. Id. at 2.
225. See BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 184, at 1.
226. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, GAINING GROUND:
AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO CARE AFTER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S FIRST OPEN ENROLLMENT PERIOD 15 (July 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue-
brief20l4/jul/1760_collins gainingground trackingsurvey.pdf; see also BAUMAN ET
AL., supra note 184, at 1 (finding that in 2015, "[mledian premiums continue to be lower
for narrowed-network plans than for broad-network plans").
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Early news reports often criticized these narrow networks for
restricting patient access to needed medical care.227  A survey by the
Associated Press found that the nation's best cancer centers were not
included in the networks for many exchange plans throughout the
country.228 In October 2013, Seattle Children's Hospital in Washington
challenged the state insurance commissioner's approval of five of seven
exchange plans that did not include the only pediatric hospital in the
county within their networks.229 There also was an outcry when Anthem
Blue Cross Blue Shield-the only issuer that applied to sell QHPs in New
Hampshire in 2014-left ten of 26 hospitals in the state out of its
network.23 °
Consumers also claimed that insurers did not adequately disclose
that their plans included narrow or tiered networks. Plaintiffs in
California have filed class action lawsuits against Anthem Blue Cross,
for example, alleging that the state's largest individual insurance carrier
had misled millions of consumers about the scope of its plans' networks
of doctors and hospitals.231  There are also reports that provider
directories are not accurate. Consumers in Florida, for example, who
purchased exchange plans, have reported that doctors listed in their
227. See, e.g., Carrie Feibel, Specialty Care Is A Challenge In Some ACA Plans,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 16, 2014); Janet Lavelle, Finding doctors who take Covered
California Plans Isn't Easy, Locals Say, SAN LuIs OBISPO TRIB. (May 29, 2014),
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2014/05/29/3086450/covered-california-health-
insurance.html; Sandhya Somashekhar & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Insurers Restricting




228. See Chad Terhune, Anthem Blue Cross Sued Again Over Narrow-Network
Health Plans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-anthem-network-suit-20140820-story.html; Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 194. As the
article notes, excluding top cancer centers from networks may also deliver "an implicit
message to cancer survivors or people with a strong family history of the disease that
they should look elsewhere," id, which raises the specter of risk selection by design. See
infra Part V(D)(l).
229. See Amy Snow Landa, Left Off Many Networks, Seattle Children's Sues,
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/htmlI/localnews/2021968776
acachildrenssuitxml.html.
230. See Sarah Palermo, Anthem's Narrow Network, N.H. Insurance Regulators
Criticized at Hearing, CONCORD MONITOR (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.concordmonitor.
com/community/town-by-town/concord/10549003-95/anthems-narrow-network-nh-
insurance-regulators-criticized-at-hearing.
231. See Julie Appleby, Lawsuit Accuses Anthem Blue Cross Of 'Fraudulent'
Enrollment Practices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 9, 2014), http://www.kaiserhealth
news.org/stories/2014/july/09/anthem-lawsuit-over-enrollment-practices.aspx.
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plans' provider directories refused to accept their insurance.232 The
federal marketplace reportedly listed a New Jersey plan as available to
residents throughout the state even though it only included one hospital
from the southern part of the state in its network.233
Several states are acting in response to concerns about network
adequacy. According to a July 2014 article in Politico, more than 70
bills have been introduced in 22 states seeking to clarify network
adequacy requirements, although only a few states have passed
legislation to date.234 As David Cusano of Georgetown University's
Center on Health Insurance Reforms has observed, "[m]ost states are
aware of the issue but are waiting to [] see how it plays out," seeing if
consumers are able to access health care via the narrow networks.235
After heavy press coverage of the Seattle Children's Hospital
lawsuit, Washington adopted comprehensive revisions to its network
adequacy regulations that went into effect in May 2014 for both
exchange and off-exchange plans, including much more specific
requirements concerning provider accessibility, requirements that
carriers grant in-network exceptions, and an obligation on carriers to
update their provider directories at least monthly.236 Following a series
of listening sessions, Nevada authorized its insurance commissioner to
begin regulating provider networks this year.237 New York enacted the
Emergency Medical Services and Surprise Bills law in June 2014, which,
among other things, adopts network adequacy standards for all health
insurers, not just HMOs.2 38  The law requires that consumers not be
232. See Daniel Chang, Some South Florida Docs Decline to Accept Obamacare,
MIAMI HERALD (July 12, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/article
1975207.html.
233.See Notes from Interview with New Jersey Hospital Association officials (on file
with authors).
234. See Brett Norman, Obamacare: Anger Over Narrow Networks, POLITICO (July
22, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obamacare-health-care-networks-
premiums- 109195.html.
235. Sara Hansard, State Regulators Take 'Wait-and-See' Approach to Narrow
Networks, BLOOMBERG BNA, 22 H.C.P.R. 800 (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Hansard,
State Regulators].
236. STATE OF WASH., OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM'R, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
MATTER No. R 2013-22 (Apr. 25, 2014); Paul Demko, Reform Update: States debate
network adequacy as insurers scramble to submit 2015 products, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(May 1, 2014), http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20140501/NEWS/305019964
[hereinafter Demko, Reform Update].
237. See Demko, Reform Update, supra note 236.
238. See A. 9205, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014); see also Nili S.
Yolin, New York Enacts Out-of-Network Transparency and Coverage Reform, MiNTz
LEVIN (July 8, 2014), http://www.healthlawpolicymatters.con/2014/07/08/new-york-
enacts-out-of-network-transparency-and-coverage-reform/.
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charged more than their in-network cost-sharing for non-emergency, out-
of-network services that they received either because there were no
adequate in-network providers or because they were referred to an out-
of-network provider without the required disclosures.239 New Hampshire
is considering how it might strengthen its existing network adequacy
requirements.2 40 A committee of the NAIC has been meeting regularly in
2014 and 2015 to consider proposed revisions to its model state law for
network adequacy, the Managed Care Network Adequacy Model Act,
which has not been modified since 1996.41
The federal government has signaled that it may expand its reach
into network adequacy regulation. In its 2015 Letter to Issuers in
Federally Facilitated Marketplaces ("FFMs") issued in March 2014
("2015 Letter to Issuers"), the Center for Consumer Information and
Insurance Oversight within HHS' CMS announced that it was altering its
QHP certification process with respect to network adequacy review for
benefit year 2015.242 Rather than relying on the accreditation status of
the issuer, as it had for plan year 2014, CMS will utilize a "reasonable
access" standard to assess provider networks and identify networks that
fail to satisfy § 156.230(a)(2)'s requirement of access "without
unreasonable delay.,243 To assess "reasonable access," CMS will focus
on healthcare areas that "have historically raised network adequacy
concerns," which may include hospital systems, mental health providers,
239. See A. 9205, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014); see also Yolin, supra
note 238.
240. See Demko, Reform Update, supra note 236; see generally N.H. INS. DEP'T,
NETWORK ADEQUACY WORKING GROUP, Legal Information, http://www.nh.gov/
insurance/legal/nhid-nwadequacywg.htm (last visited June 15, 2015).
241. See id.; Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Network Adequacy Model Review (B)
Subgroup Regulatory Framework (B) Task Force,
http://www.naic.org/committees b-rfif namr-sg.htm; NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS,
DRAFT PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL
ACT (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees-b-rftf namr-sg_
exposure draftproposed revisions mcpna model-act.pdf; Nguyen, supra note 200, at
2; Linda Tiano & M. Brian Hall, IV, National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Releases Draft Model Law Updating Managed Care Adequacy Model Act, EPSTEIN
BECKER GREEN HEALTH CARE & LIFE SCIENCES CLIENT ALERT (Nov. 2014),
http://www.ebglaw.com/news/national-association-of-insurance-commissioners-releases-
draft-model-law-updating-managed-care-adequacy-model-act/. There have been reports
that NAIC also may recommend regulatory revisions rather than a statutory route. See
Rebecca Adams, Revisions Weighed to Model Law on Adequacy of Provider Networks,
CQ HEALTHBEAT (Feb. 26, 2014). For a useful comparison of the NAIC's model law and
the ACA's network adequacy requirements, see NAIC HEALTH INS. & MANAGED CARE
(B) COMM., PLAN MGT. FUNCTION: NETWORK ADEQUACY WHITE PAPER, at Appendix C,
17-25 (June 27, 2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees-b-relatedwp_
network adequacy.pdf.
242. CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 18.
243. Id.
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oncology providers, and primary care providers.244 Throughout this
process, CMS will "share information and analysis and coordinate with
states which are conducting network adequacy reviews.245
In addition to enforcing the rather general "reasonable access"
standard, CMS also indicated in the 2015 Letter to Issuers that it intends
to articulate "time and distance or other standards" in a future
rulemaking, based on information that it learns from the QHP application
process and from the states, signaling that the agency intends to adopt
more prescriptive network adequacy regulations in the future.z46
According to news reports in mid-2014, the agency was considering
proposing new standards to regulate network adequacy that are similar to
those used to regulate Medicare Advantage networks.247 Medicare
Advantage plans measure network adequacy using a variety of criteria
that vary by type of specialty providers, health care facility, and county
type, including: minimum enrollee-to-provider ratios, maximum travel
times and distances to providers, and average number of enrollees within
a service area.248
HHS recently amended its network adequacy regulations to clarify
that a network consists only of in-network providers,249 which means that
"that the general availability of out-of- network providers will not be
counted for purposes of meeting network adequacy requirements.2 50 It
also urged-though it did not require-insurance companies that use
networks of providers to provide new enrollees with a period of
transitional care for an ongoing course of treatment.251
HHS also has provided additional guidance on how it is




247, Robert Pear, To Prevent Surprise Bills, New Health Law Rules Could Widen
Insurer Networks, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014 /07/20/us/
insurers-face-new-health-law-rules-to-widen-networks-and-prevent-surprise-
bills.html? r=0.
248. See Nguyen, supra note 200, at 3; see generally Talbot et al., supra note 200, at
327-35 (drawing on Medicaid MCO and Medicare Advantage network adequacy
regulations in recommending "adjusting standards according to degrees of rurality and
rural utilization norms; counting midlevel clinicians toward fulfillment of patient-
provider ratios; and allowing plans to ensure rural access through delivery system
innovations such as telehealth" as potential strategies to adopt network adequacy
requirements "strong enough to provide real protections for beneficiaries, yet flexible
enough to accommodate rural delivery system constraints and remain attainable for
QHPs").
249. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a) (2012).
250. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,830 (Feb. 27, 2015).
251. See id.
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announced that it was altering the safe harbor that it outlined in its 2013
guidance and now will consider an issuer to be in compliance with the
ECP requirements if the issuer's application indicates "that at least 30
percent of available ECPs in each plan's service area participate in the
provider network.,25 2 The Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for
2016 Final Rule includes a number of provisions aimed at strengthening
the ECP requirements.253 For example, multiple providers at a single
location now count as a single ECP when calculating if the insurance
carrier has satisfied the ECP participation standard.254
In addition, HHS has provided more specificity regarding the
provider directory requirements et forth in the ACA. CMS expects that
the required URL link will bring consumers directly to an up-to-date
provider directory that is specific to the particular QHP 5  If issuers
offer more than one QHP, it "should be clear to consumers which
directory applies to which QHP(s). '256 Consumers also should not have
"to log on, enter a policy number, or otherwise navigate an issuer's
website before locating the directory.257  Additionally, the directory
should indicate each provider's "location, contact information, specialty,
and medical group, any institutional affiliations, and whether the
provider is accepting new patients.258 CMS also encourages issuers to
include "languages spoken, provider credentials, and whether the
provider is an Indian health provider.,
259
252. CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 19. The 2015 Letter to Issuers
provides examples to illustrate the ECP guidelines and demonstrate sample narrative
justifications for issuers that do not satisfy the safe harbor. Id. at 20-21, 23. It also
provides additional information about the ECP guidelines and the QHP application
process, including that issuers may suggest providers to be considered as ECPs who are
not on CMS's non-exhaustive list of available ECPs and how inclusion of those
suggested providers affect the thirty percent calculation. Id. at 21-22. The 2015 Letter to
Issuers also provides additional guidance for issuers that qualify for the alternate ECP
standard in 42 C.F.R. § 156.235(a)(2) and (b). See supra note 211; CMS, 2015 Letter to
Issuers, supra note 69, at 23-24.
253. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,833-38 (Feb. 27, 2015).
254. See id. at 10,833.
255. See CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 42.
256. Id.
257. Id.; accord Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit
and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10832.
258. See CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 42. As noted supra note 217,
a federal regulation requires issuers to indicate in directories that providers are not taking
new patients. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(b) (2014).
259. CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 46.
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HHS formalized much260 of this guidance by amending its network
adequacy regulation in February 2015:
For plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2016, a QHP issuer
must publish an up-to-date, accurate, and complete provider
directory, including information on which providers are accepting
new patients, the provider's location, contact information, specialty,
medical group, and any institutional affiliations, in a manner that is
easily accessible to plan enrollees, prospective enrollees, the State,
the Exchange, HHS and OPM. A provider directory is easily
accessible when-
(i) The general public is able to view all of the current providers for a
plan in the provider directory on the issuer's public Web site through
a clearly identifiable link or tab and without creating or accessing an
account or entering a policy number; and
(ii) If a health plan issuer maintains multiple provider networks, the
general public is able to easily discern which providers participate in
which plans and which provider networks.
261
The agency believes that a provider's tier also should be clearly
identified in the directory and on the web site.262 It also requires plans to
update directories at least once per month and encourages more frequent
updates whenever possible.26 3  HHS further strongly encouraged
insurance companies to "honor what is listed in their directories even if
260. HHS did not adopt all of the commenters' suggestions for data to collect,
including:
hours physician traditionally practices at referenced practices, board
certification(s), sub-specialties practiced, language spoken by each provider,
interpreter services or communication and language assistance services that are
available at the provider's facilities and information about how enrollees can
obtain such services, publication date of directory, and a field for providing
advance notice that the provider will be leaving the network.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10832. The agency did not take a position on
each of these. See id. Rather it generally urged insurance companies "to
continuously evaluate the data they include in their directories and aim to provide all
of the information that will help consumers understand their network." Id.
261. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(b)(2). Note that although HHS did not create a special
enrollment period related to inaccurate, misleading, changing, or inadequate provider
networks, the agency noted that "consumers may be determined eligible for [a] special
enrollment period ... if an issuer substantially violates their contract with the enrollee."
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,799.
262. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,830.
263. See id. at 10,831-32.
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there are errors," and encouraged companies to establish a dedicated
email address where consumers could advise the carriers of inaccuracies
in or changes to information in the directories.264
In addition to reviewing network adequacy as part of the annual
QHP certification process, CMS indicated that it will continue to monitor
a QHP's network adequacy post-certification to determine if the QHP's
network continues to comply with certification criteria, such as through
complaint tracking.265 The agency reportedly is considering how to
collect data on provider networks to permit CMS to evaluate network
adequacy and consumers to search for providers on Healthcare.gov.
266
HHS recently finalized a regulatory requirement that insurance
companies make provider directory "information publicly available on
their Web sites in a machine-readable file and format specified by
HHS. 267  By doing so, HHS hopes software developers will "create
innovative and informative tools to help enrollees better understand the
availability of providers in a specific plan," which should improve
transparency and consumer decision-making.268
Although HHS has taken a number of steps to increase its
regulatory oversight of network adequacy since the ACA's enactment, its
approach has been measured and deliberate. The agency recently
announced in the preamble to its Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016 Final Rule that, while it "continues to take great
interest in ensuring strong network access," it will wait for the NAIC
workgroup to complete its work on revisions to the network adequacy
model act "before proposing significant changes to network adequacy
policy." 269 As a result, HHS plans to continue to apply the reasonable
access standard that it adopted in its 2015 Letter to Issuers.27 °
C. Next Steps for Network Adequacy Regulation
Moving forward, federal and state regulators will need to evaluate
how to respond to narrowing networks and who should be responding.
Some state regulators prefer that the matter be left to the states. Kansas
Insurance Commissioner Sandy Praeger, for example, who chairs the
NAIC subcommittee that is studying revisions to the network adequacy
264. Id. at 10,832.
265. Id. at 10,830.
266. Id.
267. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,830.
268. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(c) (2014).
269. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,830.
270. See id.
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model law, has said, "it's important for us at NAIC to make sure that we
are providing proper guidance to our states around network adequacy and
it stays a state issue. T271 Joel Ario, former Director of the Office of
Health Insurance Exchanges at HHS and a former insurance
commissioner in Pennsylvania and Oregon, agrees, emphasizing that
network adequacy issues vary dramatically from state to state.272 But as
discussed above, consumers and the media have raised substantial
concerns regarding the adequacy of current, mostly state-based
regulation. As discussed above,273 the federal government has indicated
its intent to regulate more directly in this field, and it remains to be seen
how the states and federal government will coordinate network adequacy
regulatory roles.
But how narrow is too narrow? Some advocates and academics
believe narrow networks threaten the health of consumers. Restricting
access to the most-expensive specialists and academic health centers can
pose especially challenging obstacles to patients with rare or complex
medical issues.274 Narrowing networks could even threaten the success
of coverage expansion. As David Blumenthal and Sara Collins of the
Commonwealth Fund have observed, "[i]f the quality is lower as a result
of such restrictions or consumers feel they cannot get the care they need,
they may stop purchasing new insurance plans, thus defeating a central
purpose of the law.,
275
Some academics and regulators, however, highlight the potential
virtues of narrow networks. For example, David Blumenthal also has
pointed out that narrow networks may give issuers greater leverage to
276negotiate lower reimbursement. The widespread use of narrow
networks reportedly contributed to relatively modest premiums in 2014,
which were 16 percent below the Congressional Budget Office's
predictions.277 BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, for example, was
able to offer consumers a plan with a premium that is less expensive than
nearly any other midlevel or silver plan in the country by using a narrow
271. Adams, supra note 241.
272. See Joyce Frieden, Regulators Shrug at Docs' Network Concerns, MEDPAGE
TODAY (Aug. 11, 2014),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PracticeManagement/Reimbursement/47164.
273. See supra notes 242-270 and accompanying text.
274. David Blumenthal, M.D., Reflecting on Health Reform - Narrow Networks:
Boon or Bane, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2014/feb/narrows-networks-boon-
or-bane.
275. See Blumenthal & Collins, supra note 222, at 5.
276. Blumenthal, supra note 274.
277. Blumenthal & Collins, supra note 222, at 4; COLLINS ET AL., supra note 226, at
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network.278 A similar plan would cost nearby Georgia residents 86
percent more each month.279 The Tennessee network included only one
of the three major hospitals in the region, but that hospital is a well-
regarded system with the area's only academic teaching hospital, high-
level trauma center, and neo-natal intensive care unit.280 While not all
consumers were happy with the restricted network, they could choose to
pay more for alternative plans with broader networks.281
Karen Ignagni, chief executive of America's Health Insurance
Plans, has represented that consumers "are weighing affordability and
breadth of network" and often choosing affordability.2 82  As recent
surveys of exchange plans' hospital networks in 2014 and 2015
conducted by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company suggest, the
increased use of narrow networks has provided consumers with greater
choice of network offerings.283 Eighty-six percent of consumers in 2014
and 90 percent in 2015 had the option to purchase a plan on the
exchanges that included a broad network, although broad network plans
had premiums that were 13 to 17 percent higher than narrow network
plan premiums in 2014 and 15 to 23 percent higher in 2015.284 Notably,
McKinsey found "no meaningful performance difference between broad
and narrowed exchange networks" based on four CMS hospital quality
metrics.285 A survey by the Commonwealth Fund found that fifty-one
percent of consumers who were given a choice of a network with fewer
doctors or hospitals at a lower cost chose the narrow network.28 6 Ario
believes that the ACA anticipated competition that includes plans with
narrow networks among a broad range of choices.287
278. See Jordan Rau, In Unhealthy Eastern Tennessee, Limited Patient Options






282. Reed Abelson, More Insured, but the Choices Are Narrowing, N.Y. TIMES
(May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/business/more-insured-but-the-
choices-are-narrowing.html?_r=0.
283. See McKfNSEY CTR, UPDATED NATIONAL VIEW, supra note 198, at 2,
284. See id.
285. See id. at 3. Note, however, that academic medical centers had higher rates of
participation in broad networks in 2014. See id..
286. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 226, at 15.
287. See Sara Hansard, Need for More Young Enrollees on Exchanges Highlighted
at Health-Care Outlook Event, BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH INS. REPT. (Jan. 22, 2104)
http://www.bna.com/need-young-enrollees-n17179881487/. [hereinafter Hansard, Need
for More].
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As is true in the debate over essential health benefits,288 network
adequacy demands that we balance access to care with costs. "'People
have to recognize it's a trade-off, and I'm not sure they do yet,' said Matt
Eyles, an insurance expert at the Avalere Health consulting firm.
'Broader access comes at a cost, and what's the right balance between
access and cost is an age-old question in health care."'
289
When it comes to network adequacy, several factors complicate the
balance that regulators need to strike between access and cost. First,
there is a question of consumer awareness. The 2014 McKinsey survey
found that 26 percent of consumers who enrolled in exchange plans did
not know whether they had chosen a broad or narrow network plan, and
this number jumped to 42 percent for consumers who previously were
not insured.290  Forty percent of consumers surveyed who chose an
exchange plan would have liked more information about which providers
participated in their plan.9 In 2015, 44 percent of consumers surveyed
who purchased an exchange plan for the first time reported that they did
not know how their plan's network was configured.292 Nineteen percent
of those surveyed in 2015 that had bought exchange plans in 2014 still
did not know how their plan was configured.293
Even when consumers are aware that a plan offers a narrow
network, they may not make a choice that rationally weighs all options
and factors. Twenty-seven percent of consumers who purchased non-
group coverage for 2014 identified cost as the most important factor in
choosing a plan, whereas only 11 percent identified choice of doctors or
providers as the most important factor.294 As insurance executive
Kathleen Oestreich explained, "[p]rice was the only differentiator"
among exchange plans: "Most consumers did not shop product and
network as carefully as they probably should have. They were very
288. See supra, Part II.
289. Norman, supra note 234.
290. See McKINSEY CTR., UPDATED NATIONAL VIEW, supra note 198, at 3, 14.
291. Id. at 15.
292. Id. at 2
293. See id.
294. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Topline: Survey of Non-Group Health Insurance
Enrollees, at 19 (June 2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/
06/8306-t2.pdf [hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Topline]. Cf Russell Korobkin,
The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection " Laws: Incomplete Contracts,
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 8-9 (Nov. 1999)
("Relying on empirical evidence that consumers have cognitive limitations that cause
them to make decisions in only a 'boundedly rational' manner, Part III examines the
ways in which even informed consumers are likely to fail to make individual health
insurance purchasing decisions in a way that promotes efficiency.").
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much focused on buying the cheapest plans, period.,295 Even if a
consumer considers provider access and not just price, however,
consumers cannot always know what types of providers they will need in
the coming year, so there are natural limits on how rational their choices
can be.296
As a result, some urge that including quality metrics in network
descriptions will assist consumer choice and minimize the risk that
consumers will evaluate network options based on price alone.
Community Catalyst, for example, recommends that, in addition to
"travel times, distances, and appointment waiting times," states consider
"quality of care and affordability, including enrollees' out-of-network
cost-sharing" when evaluating the network adequacy of plans.297 Quality
metrics can be a valuable tool to evaluate whether "less-costly providers
have comparable or better quality" than more costly providers.298 Joel
Ario, for example, has asserted that "[n]arrow or 'select' or 'tiered'
networks can be [an] integral part of quality improvement strategies as
well as a cost-saving strategy," noting that many of the networks that
299perform well on quality are integrated delivery systems like Kaiser.
295. Joanne Sammer, ACA Exchanges: Price still king, MANAGED HEALTHCARE
EXEC. (May 30, 2014), http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com/
managed-healthcare-executive/news/aca-exchanges-price-still-king?page=full.
296. See, e.g., Judy Sarasohn, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVCS., I'm
Covered Stories: A Just-in-Time Convert to Health Insurance, http://www.hhs.gov/
healthcare/facts/blog/2014/07/im-covered-stories-robert-mandler-jr.html (last visited Jul.
30, 2014) (sharing the story of a consumer who was glad he enrolled in a health insurance
plan because he subsequently learned he had a late-stage cancer); see generally
Korobkin, supra note 294, at 28 (noting that a consumer "most likely could not learn
whether, given a particular contingency, an [insurer] would provide her with a specific
treatment benefit until she experienced that condition while under the [insurer's plan]").
297. Nguyen, supra note 200, at 4; Andrew Bindman, JAMA Forum: Much Ado
About Narrow Networks (Aug. 13, 2014) http://newsatjama.jama.com/2014/08/13/jama-
forum-much-ado-about-narrow-networks/ (encouraging transparency regarding costs,
quality, and other factors used in establishing networks and the inclusion of out-of-pocket
costs incurred by consumers subject to narrow networks in actuarial value calculations).
298. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 274; see also Timothy Layton, If plans are only
offering narrow networks, blame information asymmetry, THE INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST BLOG (May 29, 2014 1:15 PM) http://theincidentaleconomist.com/
wordpress/if-plans-are-only-offering-narrow-networks-blame-information-asymmetry/
(suggesting that assigning plans "network quality tiers" in addition to metal levels may
correct information asymmetry that is contributing to market failure); see generally Mary
Agnes Carey, More Employers Limit Health Plan Networks But Seek to Preserve Quality,
Says Adviser, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014) http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/
Stories/2014/August/1 3/More-Employers-Limit-Health-Plan-Networks-But-Seek-To-
Preserve-Quality.aspx (reporting that according to Dr. Robert Galvin, chief executive
officer of Equity Healthcare, "performance networks" that are based on performance and
not just costs "are definitely increasing in popularity").
299. Joel Ario, MANATT HEALTH SOLUTIONS, The Emerging Exchange Marketplace,
at 19 (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.statereforum.org/sites/default/files/manatt-webinar_-
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Further, accountable care organizations ("ACOs"), which build quality
measures into their design, "with significant scale in a local market can
become narrow network products.3 °0  Consumers need more
information to help them distinguish high-quality narrow networks from
the rest.
To find the right balance between access and cost, it also is vital to
assess the level of access problems that are attributable to narrow
networks. As chronicled above, early news reports cited the lack of
consumer access, and attributed these problems to narrow networks.
30
1
Yet a recent survey by the Commonwealth Fund reports more
encouraging numbers:
Four of five people with new marketplace or Medicaid coverage
are optimistic that it will improve their ability to get the care they
need. More than half said they are better off now than they were
before enrolling in their new insurance.
By June 2014, six of ten adults with new marketplace or Medicaid
coverage said they had used their insurance to go to a doctor or
hospital or to fill a prescription. A majority said they would not have
been able to access or afford this care before enrolling.
More than half of adults with new coverage said their plan included
all or some of the doctors they wanted.
One of five adults with new coverage tried to find a new primary care




the emergingexchange marketplace.pdf; see also Sarah Kliff, Obamacare's narrow
networks are going to make people furious - but they might control costs, WASH. PosT
WONKBLOG (updated Jan. 13, 2014 1:30 PM)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/13/obamacares-narrow-
networks-are-going-to-make-people-furious-but-they-might-control-costs/.
300. Ario, supra note 299, at 26; see generally Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act: Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans Proposed Rule, 76
Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,899 (July 15, 2011) (explaining that HHS decided not to propose
mandatory contracting requirements with ECPs because "such a requirement may inhibit
attempts to use network design to incentivize higher quality, cost effective care by tiering
networks and driving volume towards providers that meet certain quality and value
goals"), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-15/pdf/2011-17610.pdf, see, e.g.,
Thomas Bartrum, Esq. & Deborah Farringer, Esq., BAKER DONELSON, The Rise of
Narrow Networks: Opportunities, Risks & Legal Uncertainties 5,
http://www.bakerdonelson.com/files/Uploads/Documents/BartrumNashvilleCouncil.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2014) (noting that clinically integrated networks and accountable
care organizations "can serve as the basis for either a narrow network or a tiered network
product").
301. See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text.
302. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 226, at 2.
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Similarly, in a Kaiser Family Foundation poll of non-group health
insurance enrollees, 45 percent of respondents were very satisfied and 36
percent were somewhat satisfied with their choice of primary care
doctors available under their plan.30 3  Forty-three percent were very
satisfied; 37 percent were somewhat satisfied with their choice of
hospitals and 35 percent were very satisfied; and another 35 percent were
somewhat satisfied with their choice of specialists.30 4 Fifty-six percent
believed that their current plan offered about the same choice of primary
care doctors, 13 percent thought it offered more choice, and 27 percent
thought it offered less choice than their pre-ACA coverage.30 5
Without dismissing concerns over access to particular providers,
Joel Ario cautions against overreacting to narrow networks because
"[t]he market really does need some room to innovate here.30 6 Although
there should be standards to facilitate transparency and network
adequacy, Ario urges that "there has to be a market to experiment with
tiered networks, narrow networks and different types of networks. It's
important that we don't get network adequacy standards that basically
restrict competition.,30 7  Regulators should also consider whether to
adapt network adequacy requirements to reflect delivery system and
technological innovations, including value-based purchasing, care
coordination, physician-extenders, care coordinators, and
telemedicine.°8
Joel Ario has acknowledged that one area for potential regulatory
inquiry is over whether insurers are adequately disclosing their plans'
narrow networks.30 9 Reportedly, "regulators, consumer advocates and
insurers all agree that the information about what doctors are in a plan's
network needs to be more available, up-to-date and consumer-
friendly."'3 10 Indeed, David Cusano has suggested that, if regulators act
early to improve transparency surrounding QHP provider networks,
303. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Topline, supra note 294, at 8.
304. Id. at 9.
305. Id. at 23.
306. Paul Demko, Flurry of new ACA rules adds to insurers' uncertainty, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 17, 2014)
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140317/NEWS/303179949.
307. Quote of the Day, AIS's HEALTH BUSINESS DAILY (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://aishealth.com/enews/businessnews/2014-04-03 (quoting Joel Ario in a gated
article).
308. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, NETWORK
ADEQUACY & EXCHANGES: HOW DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM AND TECHNOLOGY MAY
CHANGE HOW WE EVALUATE HEALTH PLAN PROVIDER NETWORKS, at 1-2 (2013),
http://www.ncqa.org/Portals/0/Public%20Policy/Exchanges&NetworkAdequacy_2.11.13
.pdf.
309. Hansard, Need for More, supra note 287.
310. Norman, supra note 234; see also CORLETTE ET AL.,supra notel 85, at 1, 9.
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"[t]hat might mitigate the need for more prescriptive network adequacy
standards going forward."31' The National Health Council has suggested
"that exchange websites contain a searchable formulary tool-similar to
the Medicare Part D plan finder-that facilitates comparison of QHPs by
drug coverage and cost-sharing.31 A similar tool that would enable
easy comparison of QHPs by provider network also would be a helpful
addition to exchange websites. HHS's Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016 Final Rule requires insurance companies to file
network adequacy and formulary information in machine-readable
formats,313 which should facilitate development of tools to help
consumers compare plans.
There are calls for state and federal regulators to increase their
efforts to monitor plan networks and whether consumers are accessing
care in-network or out-of-network.314 The NAIC, for example, has
recommended that regulators conduct an in-depth review of network
adequacy when the network initially is approved and then at least
annually.315 It also recommends requiring carriers to notify the state "at
least quarterly of general changes in their network, as well as requiring
prompt notice of a potential loss of a material provider, such as a hospital
or a multi-specialty clinic. 31 6 But in practice, many states "do little to
assess their network adequacy. To the extent state regulators provide
oversight, it is most commonly in response to consumer complaints.31
To facilitate ongoing monitoring of plan compliance with network
adequacy requirements and assessment of the efficacy of existing
regulatory requirements, it is important to collect and distribute data
about consumer access. As Quynh Chi Nguyen of Community Catalyst
has noted,318 the ACA requires carriers to report cost-sharing and
payments for out-of-network coverage to HHS and state regulators and to
make this information available to the public.319 This information should
311. Hansard, State Regulators, supra note 235; see also Layton, supra note 298.
312. Letter from National Health Council to Secretary Sebelius Re: Urgent Need for
Increased Network Adequacy Standards and Patient Protections against Discriminatory
Plan Designs, at 3 (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/NHCFiles/PdfFiles/NHCComments-
Draft2015IssuerLetter.pdf.
313. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,819, 10,820, 10,830,
10832-33 (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-27/pdf/2O15-
03751 .pdf.
314. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 185, at 1.
315. See NAIC HEALTH INS. & MANAGED CARE (B) COMM., supra note 241, at 5.
316. Id.
317. Nguyen, supra note 200, at 2.
318. See id. at 5.
319. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(e)(3)(A), 300gg-15a (2012).
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offer valuable insights into the network adequacy of plans that should
help regulators strike the right balance "among cost, quality, access, and
choice.32°
V. DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN DESIGN AND
ADMINISTRATION
A final way that individuals may be denied access to the essential
health benefits to which they are entitled is through plan designs that
unfairly discriminate, whether intentionally or not, as well as through
unfairly discriminatory plan administration.321 Coverage exclusions and
provider networks are examples of aspects of an insurance plan's design
with the potential to be discriminatory.322 Aspects of plan administration
that can be discriminatory include eligibility determinations, coverage
interpretations, medical necessity decisions, and rescissions of
coverage.323
Discrimination in insurance can be based on criteria such as age,
gender, national origin, race, or religion, as well as health status. Before
the passage of the ACA, it was standard practice in many states for
320. Cusano & Thomas, supra note 222; see also CORLETTE ET AL., supra note185, at
1 (concluding "that an appropriate balance between consumer choice and cost
containment can be struck with a mix of strategies that include regulatory standards,
better consumer information and more robust oversight").
321. Jessica Roberts has defined discrimination as "systematic disadvantage related
to a protected trait or status." Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism": A Critique of the
Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1159, 1172-74 (2012) (explaining that the dictionary definition of "discriminate"
is simply to differentiate, and noting that "what makes one kind of differentiation
acceptable and another morally reprehensible-and perhaps legally actionable-is a
complicated question and one that relies heavily on historical and cultural context").
322. See Parts II & IV, supra (discussing explicit exclusions from coverage and
network adequacy respectively); see also KATIE KEITH ET AL., NONDISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, THE CENTER ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE 10 (July 2013) (setting forth "benefit
design features with the potential to be discriminatory" gleaned from interviews with
state insurance regulators, representatives of national and local insurers, and consumer
advocates).
323. See supra Part III (discussing medical necessity decisions); see also, e.g., Letter
from HIV Health Care Access Working Group to Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 30, 2013) (reporting that insurance "plans have
systematically dropped people living with HIV from coverage for failure to pay
premiums timely, while allowing healthier populations to remain in coverage"); Kari E.
Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal Responses to Health Care
Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88, 92 (2002)
(reporting that insurance plans "deny transsexuals coverage for non-transition related,
medically necessary conditions such as back pain, intestinal cysts, and even cancer, under
the rationale that any medical care a transsexual needs is an excludable transsexual-
related condition").
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insurers to make eligibility determinations and to set premiums based on
health status.32 4 An insurer was allowed-indeed, sometimes required-
to base its decisions about whether to offer coverage, and, if it chose to
offer it, about how much to charge in premiums, on the amount it
expected to pay out in benefits.325
As long as they did not rely on prohibited criteria, which varied by
state, and as long as it was "actuarially fair" to do so, insurers were free
to use underwriting and rating principles to exclude people with
expensive medical conditions, including people with disabilities, from
health insurance coverage.326 In a 2013 letter to HHS, the BlueCross
BlueShield Association defended such practices, explaining that "[w]hile
some would argue that historic insurance practices such as charging a
higher rate based on health status, varying premiums based on gender
and/or age in the individual market, denying coverage based on a pre-
existing condition, and not covering maternity coverage are
discriminatory, these practices were necessary to avoid adverse selection
in a voluntary insurance market.
3 27
There are a number of examples from the past of insurance
companies making decisions based on health status that, while perhaps
fair in the actuarial sense, were widely considered to be unfair. In some
cases, the argument has been made that insurers' decision-making was
influenced by bias or stereotypes and was not, in fact, actuarially fair.328
324. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PENN. L. REv. 1577, 1597-98 (2011); see
also Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care
Coverage, 78 INDIANA L. J. 659, 661-62 (2003); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health
Insurance, 30 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 311,312-18 (1997).
325. Id.
326. Baker, supra note 324,at 1598.
327. Letter from Justine Handelman, Vice President, Legislative and Regulatory
Policy, BlueCross BlueShield Assoc., to Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HHS-OCR-2013-0007-0100; see also
KATE GREENWOOD, RUTGERS CTR. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y & SETON HALL LAW CTR.
FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & POL'Y, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S RISK ADJUSTMENT
AND OTHER RISK-SPREADING MECHANISMS: NEEDED SUPPORT FOR NEW JERSEY'S HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGE 3 (Aug. 2012), https://law.shu.edu/Health-Law/upload/affordable-
care-act-risk-adjustment-9520.pdf ("Eliminating medical underwriting removes an
important check on adverse selection, because individuals will know that if they wait
until they get sick to purchase health insurance they will no longer be rejected or have to
pay a high, perhaps unaffordably high, premium.").
328. See 4-13 THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE § 13.06 (2014)
("Proponents of these measures may argue that, statistically, the class of the handicapped
addressed are not really such bad risks as the insurers assert, and that stereotypes and bias
govern the underwriting of such risks, making these handicapped persons the subject of
unfair discrimination."); see, e.g., Letter from Disability Rights Education & Defense
Fund to Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 43 (Sept. 30,
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For example, in the 1980s, HIV disease was new and feared, and it was
expensive to treat.329 Insurers and self-funded plans reacted to the fear of
HIV and the cost of treatment of people with HIV disease by refusing to
insure individuals who tested positive for HIV330 and by excluding HIV
disease-related care from coverage.33' People with mental illness, genetic
preconditions, and a history of injury from domestic violence similarly
332have been excluded from coverage.
With the passage of the ACA, discriminating in health insurance on
the basis of disability or illness is, for the most part, no longer
permitted.333 This does not mean that discrimination will not occur,
however. This Part begins with a review of the pre-ACA laws
addressing discrimination in health insurance and of the relevant
provisions of the ACA. It then discusses the continuing potential for
insurers to discriminate based on health status through "risk
classification by design," which occurs when an insurer designs a health
insurance plan to be appealing to relatively healthy individuals or
unappealing to relatively sick individuals. Finally, this Part highlights
the continuing concern that health insurance plans may discriminate, in
design or implementation or both, against individuals in need of
treatment for mental health or substance use disorders.
A. The Intersection of Federal Anti-Discrimination Legislation and
Health Insurance Practices Prior to the Passage of the A CA
Many of the federal anti-discrimination statutes passed prior to the
enactment of the ACA did not reach discrimination in the design or
administration of health insurance plans. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, or
national origin" in programs or activities that receive "Federal financial
assistance,,335 was passed, at least in part, "to put an end to 'separate, but
2013), http://dredf.org/archived-site.shtml (alleging that the coverage limit for durable
medical equipment in California's benchmark plan "is a clear and particular example of
coverage discrimination against [people with disabilities] which has spread among small
business insurers without any kind of actuarial justification or legal analysis").
329. Kenneth Vogel, Discrimination on the Basis of HIV Infection: An Economic
Analysis, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 986 (1989).
330. Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87
S. CAL. L. REv. 195, 217-18 (2014); Vogel, supra note 329, at 991.
331. Vogel, supra note 329, at 991.
332. Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against he Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54
U. KAN. L. REv. 73, 99-107 (2005).
333. See infra Subsection V(D) and accompanying text.
334. Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7.
335. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
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equal' access to health care., 336 Title VI explicitly states, however, that
it does not apply to insurance contracts.337 Similarly, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,338 which prohibits sex discrimination in
federally-funded educational programs and activities, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975,339 which prohibits age discrimination in
programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance, do not apply
to contracts of insurance.34°
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973311 prohibits
discrimination based on disability, but only in government-funded
programs or activities. In addition, § 504, at least arguably, does not
apply to contracts of insurance.342 The Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 343 which was passed in 1990, extends to and prohibits
discrimination by private actors based on disabling health conditions.
The ADA has a safe harbor provision, however, stating that the statute
does not prohibit insurers "from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
iaw[.]
344
By contrast, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,345 which
prohibits discrimination in employment based on "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin," extends to employer-provided health benefits.
46
For example, as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
explains on its website, "[a]ny health insurance provided by an employer
must cover expenses for pregnancy related conditions on the same basis
as expenses for other medical conditions.347 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967348 extends to employer-provided health
336. Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of 'Unequal Treatment' with Health
Care Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias, 44 CONN.
L. REv. 1281, 1289 (2012).
337. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4.
338. Education Amendments of 1972 Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88.
339. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2012).
340. 20 U.S.C. § 1685 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4) (2012).
341. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
342. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (2014) ("Federal financial assistance means any grant, loan,
contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty .... .").
But see Moore v. Sun Bank of N. Florida, 923 F.2d 1423, 1429-32 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding that because Section 504 did not expressly exclude contracts of insurance or
guaranty, the regulations containing the exclusion were invalid as inconsistent with
congressional intent).
343. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
344. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
345. Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
347. Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-preg.cfrn (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).
348. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
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benefits as well, but it "explicitly allows employers to provide older
workers with lesser benefits than younger workers.349
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA),35 ° which was passed in 1996, was the first federal law that
both (1) prohibited, in part, discrimination based on health status, and (2)
applied to health insurance. HIPAA requires issuers of small-group
health insurance to accept every small employer that applies for
coverage,351 and it requires issuers of individual, small, and large group
insurance to "renew or continue in force such coverage" at the sole
option of the individual or group.352 HIPAA also makes it illegal for any
group health plan to make an eligibility determination about an
individual based on that individual's "health status-related factors"
including, among other factors, current health status, medical history,
353and claims experience. HIPAA also restricts the ability of group
health plans to exclude pre-existing conditions from coverage.354 In
addition, group health plans may not, on the basis of a health status-
related factor, "require any individual (as a condition of enrollment or
continued enrollment under the plan) to pay a premium or contribution
which is greater than such premium or contribution for a similarly
situated individual enrolled in the plan[.], 355 Professor Jessica Roberts
summarizes the statute as follows: "HIPAA ... outlaws excluding or
medically underwriting individuals in the context of group health
insurance. '356  HIPAA did not outlaw excluding or medically
underwriting individuals in the context of individual health insurance,
nor did it prevent issuers from varying the premiums they charged to
349. Crossley, supra note 332, at 96.
350. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C.,
29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
351. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a). Issuers of small group health insurance are also
required to "accept for enrollment every eligible individual ... who applies for
enrollment during the period in which the individual first becomes eligible to enroll under
the terms of the group health plan and may not place any restriction which is inconsistent
with section 2702 [prohibiting discrimination based on health status-related factors] on an
eligible individual being a participant or beneficiary." Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act § 2711, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 l(a)(1)(B).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(a) (2012).
353. 26 U.S.C. § 9802(a)(1)(A)-(H) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)-(H) (2012);
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a)(1)-(9) (2012).
354. 26 U.S.C. § 9801(a) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
3(a) (1996).
355. 26 U.S.C. § 9802(b)(1) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
300gg(a)(1)(A)-(B)(2012).
356. Roberts, supra note 321, at 1180.
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small groups based on the health status of the groups' individual
members.
Unlike HIPAA, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 (GINA)357 applies to individual as well as to group health plans,
358
but it only bans discrimination based on genetic information. Under
GINA, health insurers cannot request, require, purchase, or use genetic
information for underwriting purposes, treat genetic information as a
preexisting condition, or adjust premium or contribution amounts on the
basis of genetic information.359 As Professor Roberts explains, GINA
''represents a move away from a purely economic approach to health
insurance to an antidiscrimination model" because it "restricts a health
insurer from considering a certain type of health-related information,
even though assessing that information would facilitate more accurate
risk assessment.,
360
In the years prior to the passage of the ACA, individual states took a
number of steps to address discrimination in health insurance. Some
states passed legislation based on the NAIC's model Unfair Trade
Practices Act, which prohibits "any unfair discrimination between
individuals of the same class and of essentially the same hazard in the
amount of premium, policy fees or rates charged for any accident or
health insurance policy or in the benefits payable thereunder, or in any of
the terms or conditions of such policy, or in any other manner.' 36 1 The
NAIC Model Act also prohibits "refusing to insure, refusing to continue
to insure, or limiting the amount of coverage available to an individual
357. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.).
358. 26 U.S.C. § 9802 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53 (2012).
359. See 29 U.S.C. 1182(b)(3)(A)-(d)(3) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b)(3)-(d)(3);
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53(a)-(e) (2012).
360. Roberts, supra note 321, at 1184.
361. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 4(G)(2) (Jan.
2004), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-880.pdf (listing states that have adopted the
Model Act in whole or in part as of April 2014). States also have passed laws based on
the NAIC's Model Regulation on Unfair Discrimination in Life and Health Insurance on
the Basis of Physical or Mental Impairment and on its Model Regulation on Unfair
Discrimination in Life and Health Insurance on the Basis of Blindness or Partial
Blindness. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MODEL REGULATION ON UNFAIR
DISCRIMINATION IN LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL OR MENTAL
IMPAIRMENT (June 1979), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-887.pdf (listing states that
have adopted the model regulation in whole or in part as of January 2014); NAT'L ASS'N
OF INS. COMM'RS, MODEL REGULATION ON UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE ON THE BASIS OF BLINDNESS OR PARTIAL BLINDNESS (Apr. 1997),
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-888.pdf (listing states that have adopted the model
regulation in whole or in part as of January 2014).
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because of the sex, marital status, race, religion or national origin of the
individual. 362
B. Federal and State Mental Health Parity Laws
Prior to the ACA, federal and state laws were passed that
specifically targeted discrimination against behavioral and mental health
treatment in insurance. At the federal level, the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act
(MHPAEA),363 which was passed in 2008, built upon groundwork laid
by earlier legislation, the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA).364
The MHPAEA required large group insurance plans that offered mental
health and substance use disorder benefits to offer the same annual or
lifetime dollar limits, treatment or visit limits, cost-sharing, and access to
out-of-network care as they did for medical or surgical benefits.365
While many states passed mental health parity laws as well, gaps
remained.366 As discussed in the next Subsection, the ACA fills many of
the gaps left by previous legislation, extending, in the words of Professor
Tom Baker, "the nondiscrimination vision of what constitutes a fair share
from the large-group market to the individual and small-group
market[s] .,,367
C. The Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the ACA
The ACA extended the MHPAEA to all health insurance plans in
the individual market.368 In addition, as discussed above in Part II(B),
most individual and small-group health insurance plans must provide
362. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 4(G)(5), supra
note 361.
363. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511-12, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1185a (2012) & 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)).
364. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701-03, 110 Stat.
2944 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 11 85a & 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26).
365. See Sarah Goodell, Health Policy Brief: Mental Health Parity, HEALTH AFFAIRS
2 (Apr. 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybiefs/briefp dfs/healthpolicybrief
1 12.pdf.
366. Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 457 (2012) (explaining that state mental health parity laws
"vary widely in their application and scope").
367. Baker, supra note 324, at 1602.
368. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012) (explaining in accompanying notes that the
ACA substituted language referring to issuers offering both individual and group health
insurance plans for language referring solely to issuers offering group health insurance
plans); see also § 1311(j) (providing that "Section 2726 of the Public Health Service Act
[42 USCS § 300gg-26] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same manner and to the
same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers and group health plans").
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coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services as one of
the ten categories of essential health benefits required by the ACA.3 69 As
the Department of Labor has explained, the essential health benefits
regulations require non-grandfathered plans in both the individual and
small-group markets "to comply with the requirements of the parity
regulations to satisfy the requirement to provide EHB.' 37°
The ACA is also the first federal law that directly addresses and
bans discrimination in health insurance on the basis of health status.
Section 1201 of the ACA restricts (1) the grounds on which "group
health plan[s]" and "health insurance issuers offering group or individual
health insurance coverage" can base eligibility determinations; and (2)
the grounds on which they can charge higher premiums.37' Issuers are
barred from establishing "rules for eligibility 3 72 and from charging
higher premiums based on the following factors: (1) health status; (2)
medical condition (including both physical and mental illnesses); (3)
claims experience; (4) receipt of health care; (5) medical history; (6)
genetic information; (7) evidence of insurability (including conditions
arising out of acts of domestic violence); (8) disability; and (9) any other
health status-related factor determined appropriate by the Secretary.373
The regulations implementing § 1201 generally approve of health
insurer actions to the extent that they are "applied uniformly to all
369. See supra Part 1(B).
370. FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part XVIII and Mental
Health Parity Implementation, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-
acal8.html (last visited July 13, 2015).
371. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.
372. "Rules for eligibility" is defined broadly, to include "(A) Enrollment; (B) The
effective date of coverage; (C) Waiting (or affiliation) periods; (D) Late and special
enrollment; (E) Eligibility for benefit packages (including rules for individuals to change
their selection among benefit packages); (F) Benefits (including rules relating to covered
benefits, benefit restrictions, and cost-sharing mechanisms such as coinsurance,
copayments, and deductibles) ... ; (G) Continued eligibility; and (H) Terminating
coverage (including disenrollment) of any individual under the plan." 45 C.F.R.
§ 146.121(b)(1)(ii) (2014).
373. Section 1201's implementing regulations provide that in addition to acts of
domestic violence, "evidence of insurability" includes "[p]articipation in activities such
as motorcycling, snowmobiling, all-terrain vehicle riding, horseback riding, skiing, and
other similar activities." Id. § 146.121 (a)(2)(ii). The ACA permits insurers to vary the
premiums they charge based on four factors: (1) whether a plan covers an individual or
family; (2) what the plan's geographic rating area is; (3) how old the insured individual is
(but then only by up to a factor of three to one); and (4) whether the insured individual
uses tobacco (but then only by a factor of up to 1.5 to 1). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg(a)(l)(A); see also TARA ADAMS RAGONE, RUTGERS CENTER FOR STATE HEALTH
POLICY & SETON HALL LAW CENTER FOR HEALTH & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & POLICY,
EVALUATING FEDERAL AND NEW JERSEY REGULATION OF RATING FACTORS AND RATE
BANDS 6-7 (Aug. 2012), http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/publications/evaluating-federal-
and-new-jersey-regulation-of-rating-factors-and-rate-bands.
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similarly situated individuals" and are "not directed at individual
participants or beneficiaries.""3 4 The regulations allow health insurance
plans to:
limit or exclude benefits in relation to a specific disease or condition,
limit or exclude benefits for certain types of treatments or drugs, or
limit or exclude benefits based on a determination of whether the
benefits are experimental or not medically necessary, but only if the
benefit limitation or exclusion applies uniformly to all similarly
situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or
beneficiaries based on any health factor of the participants or
beneficiaries.
375
A second provision of the ACA, § 1557, provides that "any health
program or activity" that receives federal funds may not discriminate
against individuals on any ground prohibited under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act (race, color, or national origin), Title IX of the Education
Amendments (sex), the Age Discrimination Act (age), or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (disability).3 76 Unlike other anti-discrimination laws,
§ 1557 explicitly states that it applies where the federal funds in question
consist of "credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance.,
377
In September 2015, HHS released draft regulations implementing
§ 1557.378 The preamble to the draft regulations clarifies that § 1557's
anti-discrimination prohibition applies broadly,
to all issuers that receive Federal financial assistance, whether those
issuers' products are offered through the Marketplace, outside the
Marketplace, in the individual or group health insurance markets, or
as an employee health benefit program through an employer-
sponsored group health plan. Thus, for example, an issuer that
participates in the Marketplace and thereby receives Federal financial
assistance, and that also offers plans outside the Marketplace, will be
covered by the proposed regulation for all of its health plans, as well
as when it acts as a third party administrator for an employer-
sponsored group health plan.
374. 45 C.F.R. § 146.121; see also id. §147.110 (explaining that, with the exception
of wellness programs, the provisions of 45 C.F.R. § 146.121 apply to the individual
market as well).
375. Id. § 146.121(b)(2)(B).
376. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
377. Id.
378. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities,80 Fed. Reg. 54,172,
54,172-221 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
379. Id. at 54,189.
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The preamble states that HHS is aware of least 180 health insurance
issuers that are participating in the Federally-facilitated and State-based
marketplaces and so are covered by § 1557.380
The draft regulations contain a provision addressing discrimination
by health insurance issuers, 45 C.F.R. § 92.207, but it offers few
specifics.381 Timothy Jost and other commenters have expressed surprise
that "the proposed rule does not directly address one of the most salient
current discrimination questions: whether insurers can impose high cost
sharing or otherwise limit access to expensive drugs needed by certain
disabled populations, like persons with AIDS. 382
Discrimination is also addressed in other provisions of the ACA and
in their implementing regulations. The statutory section setting forth the
EHB requirement provides that, in defining the requirement, "the
Secretary shall.., not make coverage decisions, determine
reimbursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design benefits in
ways that discriminate against individuals because of their age,
disability, or expected length of life[.],, 383 The same provision goes on to
require that the Secretary, in defining EHB, "take into account the health
care needs of diverse segments of the population, including women,
children, persons with disabilities, and other groups" and "ensure that
health benefits established as essential not be subject to denial to
individuals against their wishes on the basis of the individuals' age or
expected length of life or of the individuals' present or predicted
disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life. 384
The regulations implementing the EHB requirement state that "[a]n
issuer does not provide EHB if its benefit design, or the implementation
of its benefit design, discriminates based on an individual's age, expected
length of life, present or predicted disability, degree of medical
dependency, quality of life, or other health conditions.,385 This general
rule against discrimination on the basis of health is subject to the caveat
380. Id. at 54,198.
381. Id. at 54,219-20. The draft version of § 92.207 does offer the following specific
examples of illegal sex discrimination in insurance, providing that issuers cannot
"[c]ategorically or automatically exclude from coverage, or limit coverage for, all health
services related to gender transition; or [o]therwise deny or limit coverage, or deny a
claim, for specific health services related to gender transition if such denial or limitation
results in discrimination against a transgender individual." Id. at 54,220.
382. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: HHS Proposes Rule
Implementing Anti-Discrimination ACA Provisions (Contraceptive Coverage Litigation
Update), HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Sept. 4, 2015, 1:00 PM),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/09/04/implementing-health-reform-hhs-proposes-rule-
implementing-anti-discrimination-aca-provisions/.
383. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(B) (2012).
384. Id. § 18022(b)(4)(C)-(D).
385. 45 C.F.R. § 156.125(a) (2014).
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that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent an issuer from
appropriately utilizing reasonable medical management techniques.
38 6
The regulations governing QHPs provide that an "issuer must not, with
respect to its QHP, discriminate on the basis of race, color, national
origin, disability, age, sex, gender identity or sexual orientation.3 87 A
separate provision extends the requirement to any issuer "providing
EHB.,388
As discussed above in Part II.C, beginning in 2017, plans will not
be considered to be providing EHB unless they use a P&T committee to
determine which drugs to include on their formularies.389 Among other
things, the P&T committee will be responsible for ensuring that the
plan's formulary "[c]overs a range of drugs across a broad distribution of
therapeutic categories and classes and recommended drug treatment
regimens that reat all disease states, and does not discourage nrollment
by any group of enrollees[.],,390 Also beginning in 2017, plans must,
with certain exceptions, give enrollees the option of purchasing their
medications at a brick-and-mortar pharmacy.391 In the preamble to the
Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, CMS noted "that
making drugs available only by mail order could discourage enrollment
by, and thus discriminate against, transient individuals and individuals
who have conditions they wish to keep confidential.392
The statute and regulations also address discriminatory marketing
practices. The statute bars a plan from "employ[ing] marketing practices
or benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment in
such plan by individuals with significant health needs.,393  The
regulations elaborate on this, requiring that issuers:
must comply with any applicable state laws and regulations regarding
marketing by health insurance issuers and cannot employ marketing
practices or benefit designs that will have the effect of discouraging
the enrollment of individuals with significant health needs in health
insurance coverage or discriminate based on an individual's race,
color, national origin, present or predicted disability, age, sex, gender
386. Id. § 156.125(c).
387. Id. § 156.200(e) (2014).
388. Id. § 156.125(b).
389. Id. § 156.122(a)(3).
390. Id. § 156.122(a)(3)(iii)(H)(1) (emphasis added).
391. Id. §156.122(e).
392. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,821 (Feb. 27, 2015).
393. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(A) (2012).
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identity, sexual orientation, expected length of life, degree of medical
dependency, quality of life, or other health conditions.
394
D. The Continuing Possibility of Health Status Discrimination
With the passage and implementation of the ACA, it might be
expected that few, if any, insurance plans will overtly discriminate on the
basis of prohibited criteria, including potentially "actuarially fair" criteria
such as current health status or medical history. As Professor Baker has
noted, the ACA's guaranteed issue and renewal requirements39 5
"eliminate the traditional authority of health insurance companies to
choose whom they will insure[.] '396  Moreover, the prohibition on
preexisting condition exclusions397 eliminates their authority to choose
which risks they will insure against. The ACA does not, however,
entirely eliminate insurers' incentive to attract low-risk consumers and
avoid high risk (including disabled or chronically ill) consumers.
1. Risk Classification by Design
Issuers may respond to this incentive by discriminating in a subtle
way, adopting plan features designed to make the plans more attractive to
the low-risk consumers whom the issuers wish to attract, and less
attractive to the high-risk consumers whom they do not. Professor
Baker's term for this subtle form of discrimination is "risk classification
by design.,398 As Professor Baker describes it, "insurance products can
be designed to appeal differentially to people with different risk
characteristics, so that people self-select into separate risk pools in a
manner that correlates with their risk status.,
399
Consider, for example, a state or region with an array of cancer
specialists and facilities. Many of the providers may be well-qualified to
provide services, but one facility or provider stands out as a true center of
excellence. Should a self-interested insurer include the center of
excellence in its network? The theory of risk classification by design
suggests that the answer may be no-even if the center of excellence can
394. 45 C.F.R. § 147.104(e); see also id. § 156.225 ("A QHP issuer and its officials,
employees, agents and representatives must-(a) State law applies. Comply with any
applicable State laws and regulations regarding marketing by health insurance issuers;
and (b) Non-discrimination. Not employ marketing practices or benefit designs that will
have the effect of discouraging the enrollment of individuals with significant health needs
in QHPs.").
395. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a)-(b)(1) (2012); id. § 300gg-2(a).
396. Baker, supra note 324, at 1588.
397. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.
398. Baker, supra note 324, at 1580.
399. Id. at 1610.
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provide very good cancer care at a reasonable price-because by
including it the issuer may make its plan more attractive to high-cost
cancer patients. It could be in the insurer's best interest, instead, to
include cancer facilities and specialists in its network (to meet regulatory
requirements or general consumer expectations) but not the center of
excellence.
Professor Baker points to four ways in which the ACA reduces the
potential for insurers to discriminate on the basis of health status through
risk classification by design.400 First, as discussed in Part II above, the
ACA "set[s] a floor for contract quality standards on the health plans that
may be offered in the individual and small-group market.",401 Plans must
cover essential health benefits,4 °2 subject to limits on enrollee cost-
sharing.40 3 Plans must also meet one of the four "actuarial value" or
metal level requirements, which are denoted bronze, silver, gold, and
platinum.40 4 Professor Baker writes that "by reducing the range of
variation among plans, the[se] minimum standards reduce the room for"
risk classification by design.40 5
Second, there are the ACA's risk adjustment, risk corridors, and
reinsurance provisions, which were designed, in part, to reduce the losses
issuers sustain from enrolling relatively high-risk individuals, and to
ensure that they do not benefit, or benefit less than they otherwise would,
from enrolling relatively low-risk individuals.40 6 As Professor Baker
explains, if risk adjustment works as hoped, plans will not have an
incentive to try to attract relatively low-risk individuals because their net
premiums after adjustment will reflect the entire market's risk pool,
"rather than the pool of the particular plan.'A 7
The third aspect of the ACA that counteracts the tendency of issuers
to engage in risk classification by design is the medical loss ratio
requirement, which plays a similar role to risk adjustment, reducing the
short-term profits insurers can earn from enrolling low-risk individuals
who need relatively little medical care.40 8 Professor Baker argues that
400. Id. at 1611-15.
401. Id. at 1587.
402. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a) & (b).
403. Id. § 18022(c).
404. Id. § 18022(d).
405. Baker, supra note 324, at 1588.
406. GREENWOOD, supra note 327, at ii.
407. Baker, supra note 324, at 1614.
408. TARA ADAMS RAGONE, RUTGERS CENTER FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY & SETON
HALL LAW CENTER FOR HEALTH & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW & POLICY, THE AFFORDABLE
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the medical loss ratio actually encourages insurers to enroll high-risk
individuals.4"9 The fact that a percentage of the medical expenses of a
high-risk population is more than a percentage of the medical expenses
for a low-risk population leaves "more money to pay for the CEO's
j et.A
410
The fourth and final aspect of the ACA that Professor Baker points
to as reducing the potential for risk classification by design is what he
calls the exchange certification requirement.41' Before a health plan may
be certified as qualified to be sold on an exchange, the exchange must
determine that making it available "is in the interests of qualified
individuals and qualified employers in the State or States in which such
Exchange operates[.],,412  Professor Baker suggests that exchanges
consider whether a plan is deliberately designed to lead to risk
classification in making the decision whether to certify it.
413
In its 2015 Letter to Issuers, CMS explained its approach to
ensuring "compliance with nondiscrimination standards" in FFMs, an
approach which it encouraged state-run exchanges to use as well.414
CMS wrote:
[t]o ensure non-discrimination in QHP benefit design, CMS will
perform an outlier analysis on QHP cost-sharing (e.g., co-payments
and co-insurance) as part of the QHP certification application
process. QHPs identified as outliers may be given the opportunity to
modify cost sharing for certain benefits if CMS determines that the
cost sharing structure of the plan that was submitted for certification
could have the effect of discouraging the enrollment of individuals
with significant health needs.
415
Among the benefits CMS expected to compare with regard to cost-
sharing are inpatient hospital stays, inpatient mental/behavioral health
stays, specialist visits, emergency room visits, and prescription drugs.
416
The agency explained that "[d]iscriminatory cost-sharing language
would typically involve reduction in the generosity of a benefit in some
manner for subsets of individuals other than based on clinically indicated
common medical management practices.417 With regard to prescription
drug coverage, the agency expected to focus on "plans that are outliers
409. Baker, supra note 324, at 1614.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1611-12.
412. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(1) (2012).
413. Baker, supra note 324, at 1612.
414. CMS, 2015 Letter to Issuers, supra note 69, at 27.
415. Id. at 28.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 29.
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based on an unusually large number of drugs subject to prior
authorization and/or step therapy requirements in a particular category
and class."
418
In the preamble to the Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters
for 2016, CMS reiterated its commitment to "notify[ing] an issuer when
we see an indication of a reduction in the generosity of a benefit in some
manner for subsets of individuals that is not based on clinically indicated,
reasonable medical management practices.,419  The agency also
highlighted "three examples of potentially discriminatory practices" that
could require "further investigation by the enforcing entity. '420 The three
examples were as follows: "(1) [a]ttempts to circumvent coverage of
medically necessary benefits by labeling the benefit as a 'pediatric
service,' thereby excluding adults; (2) refusal to cover a single-tablet
drug regimen or extended-release product that is customarily prescribed
and is just as effective as a multi-tablet regimen, absent an appropriate
reason for such refusal; and (3) placing most or all drugs that treat a
specific condition on the highest cost tiers.421
CMS' third example echoes a complaint filed on May 29, 2014,
with the Office of Civil Rights of HHS by the National Health Law
Program and The AIDS Institute, a Tampa-based non-profit, alleging that
four of the thirty-six silver level QHPs offered in Florida "charge
inordinately high co-payments and co-insurance for medications used in
the treatment of HIV and AIDS. 42 2 Each of the four plans was alleged
to place all HIV drugs, branded and generic, on the plan's least-preferred
tier, requiring enrollees to make coinsurance payments of forty to fifty
percent of the retail cost of the drug.423 Some enrollees also were subject
to deductibles.424 Finally, for at least three of the four plans, medications
418. Id. at 28.
419. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10822-23 (Feb. 27, 2015).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 10,822.
422. THE AIDS INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM,
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT RE: DISCRIMINATORY PHARMACY BENEFITS DESIGN IN
SELECT QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS OFFERED IN FLORIDA 2-3 (MAY 29, 2014),
http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/HHS-HIV-
Complaint#.UlBmGPp-Uk [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT]. According to an
August 6, 2014 Associated Press article, advocates in Georgia are planning to file a
similar complaint, and advocates in California, Illinois, and Ohio have said that exchange
plans in their states have issues similar to the issues in Florida. Kelli Kennedy, AIDS
Patients Fear Discrimination in ACA Exchange, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 6, 2104, 5:22
PM), http://news.yahoo.com/aids-patients-fear-discrimination-aca-exchange-
212246484.html.
423. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT, supra note 422, at 8-9.
424. Id.
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placed in the least-preferred tier were subject to prior authorization
requirements and quantity limits.
425
The complainants wrote that "[t]he practice of placing all anti-
retrovirals on the highest tier is not a market norm or necessity.42 6 In
support of this argument, they pointed to the fact that "[o]ther issuers [of
Florida QHPs] vary tiering or place HIV drugs on more affordable
tiers.,427 The complainants contended that the four plans' treatment of
HIV drugs will "discourage people living with HIV and AIDS from
enrolling in those health plans-a practice which unlawfully discriminates
on the basis of disability.' 42' Each of the four plans identified in the
complaint has entered into settlement agreements with the Florida Office
of Insurance Regulation, while denying that they engaged in illegal
discrimination.429 HHS' investigation is ongoing.43°
Spurred by the complaint brought by The AIDS Institute and the
National Health Law Program, the pharmaceutical industry trade
association, PhRMA, engaged the consulting firm Avalere Health to
analyze the formularies of 123 silver marketplace plans.431  Avalere
Health focused on the out-of-pocket expense patients could face for each
drug, whether branded or generic, in nineteen different drug classes.4 32 It
found that 52 percent of silver plans require coinsurance of 30 percent or
higher for all covered drugs in at least one class, while 39 percent of
silver plans require coinsurance of 40 percent or higher for all covered
drugs in at least one class.433 Avalere Health also found that 86 percent
of silver plans place all covered drugs in at least one class on the highest
formulary tier.434
Avalere Health's analysis suggests that people with HIV and AIDS
are not alone. In a summary of the analysis, PhRMA notes that:
425. Id.
426. Id. at 10.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 3.
429. Nicholas Nehamas, Preferred Voluntarily Caps HIV Drug Prices, MIAMI
HERALD (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/health-
care/article7893084.html.
430. Id.
431. AVALERE HEALTH, AN ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN EXCHANGE PLAN BENEFITS 5 (Jure
2014), http://www.phrma.org/sites/de fault/files/2 0140521 FINAL%20PhRMA_
High%20Coinsurance%20and%2OTier/o20PlacementAvalere /5B7a%/5D_0.pdf
432. PHRMA, COVERAGE WITHOUT ACCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXCHANGE PLAN
BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN MEDICINES, http://www.phrma.org/affordable-care-act/coverage-
without-access-an-analysis-of-exchange-plan-benefits-for-certain-
medicines#sthash.oObB3Xh0.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) [hereinafter COVERAGE
WITHOUT ACCESS].
433. AVALERE HEALTH, supra note 43 1, at 2-3.
434. Id. at 4.
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[i]n seven classes, more than 20 percent of the plans require
coinsurance of 40 percent or more for all medicines in the class. Over
60 percent of the plans place all covered medicines in the class for
treating multiple sclerosis on the formulary tier with the highest cost
sharing. Similarly, over 60 percent of the plans place all covered
medicines in certain classes for treating cancer on the formulary tier
with the highest cost sharing.
435
PhRMA contends that these findings "suggest a lack of adequate
formulary scrutiny on the part of state and federal regulators" because
"[r]equiring high cost sharing for all medicines in a class is exactly the
type of practice the ACA was designed to prevent.4 36 When Katie Keith
and colleagues at the Center for Health Insurance Reforms at the
Georgetown University Health Policy Institute interviewed state
regulators about the potential for discriminatory formulary designs,
however, some argued that in-depth scrutiny of drug formularies "would
be an expansion of their traditional regulatory role because it requires an
understanding of the latest drug treatments, patient needs, and evidence-
based treatments.437
2. The Challenges of Putting Mental Health Parity into Practice
As mental health parity is put into practice across a broad array of
health insurance plans, disputes are likely to arise. Eric Goplerud, of the
independent research organization NORC at the University of Chicago,
has observed that "Itihe history of parity legislation shows that
implementation of requirements in this area is not always straightforward
and ensuring equitable treatment of mental health (MH) and substance
use disorder (SUD) treatment is often complicated.,438 In a recent Health
Affairs Health Policy Brief, Sarah Goodell quoted a health insurance
executive who commented that "[h]ow to provide coverage for care
levels and treatment venues that are unique to behavioral health, and
aligning these with medical and surgical benefits, is a continuing
discussion within health plans and between plans and regulators.,
439
A study of large group plans' compliance with the MHPAEA that
Goplerud conducted for HHS in November 2013 revealed that 20 percent
of such plans required higher copayments, and four percent required
435. COVERAGE WITHOUT ACCESS, supra note 432.
436. Id.
437. KEITH ET AL., supra note 322, at 11.
438. ERIC GOPLERUD, CONSISTENCY OF LARGE EMPLOYER AND GROUP HEALTH PLAN
BENEFITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL
HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 vii (Nov. 2013).
439. Goodell, supra note 365, at 4.
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more in coinsurance for in-network outpatient MH/SUD services than for
equivalent medical or surgical care.440  Goplerud also found that
"although the percentage of plans with more restrictive treatment
limitations dropped substantially since the introduction of MHPAEA, a
minority of plans in our post-parity sample, between seven percent and
nine percent, still covered fewer MH and SIJD inpatient days annually
and fewer MH and SUD outpatient visits annually than they covered for
medical/surgical conditions."441 Less obvious inequities in plan design
may persist as well. For example, plans may continue to use different
approaches to determining medical necessity for behavioral and mental
health treatments, they may incorporate step therapy or "fail first"
requirements that do not apply to physical health treatments, and they
may require prior authorization for behavioral and mental health
treatments beyond what is required for physical health treatments.42
Even if plans are equitable on paper, discrimination may occur in
their administration. In July of 2014, for example, the New York State
Attorney General announced that an investigation it conducted revealed
that "since at least 2011, EmblemHealth, through its behavioral health
subcontractor, Value Options, issued sixty-four percent more denials of
coverage in behavioral health cases than in medical cases."443  The
investigation also showed that EmblemHealth "did not cover residential
treatment for behavioral health conditions ... while covering similar
treatment-skilled nursing, for example-for medical conditions."'444 The
Attorney General highlighted a case in which EmblemHealth "denied
coverage of residential treatment for a young woman with a severe case
of anorexia nervosa, a potentially life-threatening condition" and "only
agreed to cover the treatment after the Attorney General's Health Care
bureau intervened.4 45 EmblemHealth also improperly denied coverage
of residential treatment for individuals with substance use disorders,
requiring enrollees to have recently tried and failed an outpatient
program, for example, or to be experiencing "life-threatening
440. GOPLERUD, supra note 438, at xii.
441. Id.
442. Letter from James H. Scully, Jr., Medical Director and Chief Executive Officer,
American Psychiatric Assoc., to Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Scully Letter],
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HHS-OCR-2013-0007-0091.
443. Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, A.G.
Schneiderman Announces Settlement With Emblem Health For Wrongly Denying
Mental Health And Substance Abuse Treatment For Thousands Of New York Members
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withdrawal" before approving an inpatient stay.446 Notably, the Attorney
General's settlement with EmblemHealth is one of a total of five mental
health parity settlements that the New York State Attorney General has
reached with insurers since 2014.447
Disputes over the level and duration of treatment that is medically
necessary for individuals with substance use disorders may be
particularly frequent. In a March 2014 news article, Jayne O'Donnell
reported that "treatment centers say disagreement over [parity] leaves
many alcoholics and drug addicts without the coverage they need.,448 A
study conducted by the National Association of Addiction Treatment
Professionals of 800 disputes between insurance companies and
providers over such treatment found that "89% of disagreements over
whether treatment was on par with what would be covered for medical
issues such as diabetes or heart disease were related to detox, [i]npatient
or residential treatment.
4 49
A 2013 analysis of commercial insurance plans by the Treatment
Research Institute for the American Society of Addiction Medicine
("ASAM") found significant barriers for enrollees seeking coverage of
Food and Drug Administration-approved medications to treat opioid
dependence. 450  The Treatment Research Institute found that these
446. Id.
447. See id.; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney General, A.G.
Schneiderman Announces Settlement With Excellus Health Plan To End Wrongful
Denial Of Mental Health And Addiction (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-excellus-health-plan-end-wrongful-
denial-mental; Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman
Announces Settlement With ValueOptions To End Wrongful Denial Of Mental Health
And Substance Abuse Treatment Services (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-valueoptions-end-wrongful-denial-
mental-health; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney General, A.G.
Schneiderman Announces Settlement With Health Insurer That Wrongly Denied Mental
Health Benefits To Thousands Of New Yorkers (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settement-heath-insurer-wrongy-denied-
mental-health (announcing settlement with MVP Health Care); Press Release, N.Y. State
Office of the Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement With Health
Care Insurer For Wrongfully Denying Mental Health Treatment Claims (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-health-care-
insurer-wrongfully-denying-mental (announcing settlement with Cigna Corporation).
448. Jayne O'Donnell, Is Substance Abuse Coverage as Equal as Required?, USA
TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014, 10:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/03/10/substance-abuse-treatment-coverage-obamacare/6176881/.
449. Id.
450. See generally MADY CHALK ET AL., ADVANCING ACCESS TO ADDICTION
MEDICATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR OPIOtD ADDICTION TREATMENT, REPORT OF COMMERCIAL
HEALTH PLAN MEDICATION COVERAGE AND BENEFITS SURVEY, TREATMENT RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (TRI) (2013), http://www.tresearch.org/tri-contributes-to-american-society-of-
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medications were subject to a variety of utilization management
techniques including prior authorization requirements, "fail first"
requirements, and limits on dosage and prescription duration.41 Not one
of the commercial plans studied covered methadone maintenance
therapy.452
3. The Need for Enforcement
Many commentators have identified concerns that forms of
discrimination could arise that might be difficult to discern. Professor
Baker has pointed to the risk that insurers could marginally improve the
risk profile of their insured pool by engaging in "risk classification by
design.453 Although he points to features in the ACA that may blunt the
likelihood of this form of discrimination,454 it will be important for
researchers to evaluate the extent to which the statute succeeds in
encouraging non-discriminatory behavior.
CMS has announced an approach to uncover discriminatory
practices by reviewing-and encouraging marketplace officials to review-
the proportionality of the allocation of cost-sharing among modes of
service.455 If examination shows that costs inequitably burden people
with particular vulnerabilities, CMS will take action. This is an
important initiative, but it will not uncover other aspects of insurance
plans that might be unfairly discriminatory.457
Recent complaints have raised concerns about whether formulary
design in some plans disproportionately burdens people with H1V
disease or other chronic conditions.458 Close attention to the effects of
formulary design and other market behavior of insurers will be crucial to
uncover potentially problematic conduct that could constitute unlawful
discrimination. It is likely that most of such conduct, if it occurs, will be
relatively subtle, and will only be revealed through attentive review of
the marketplace by advocates, researchers, and regulators.
addiction-medicines-review-of-advancing-access-to-addiction-mediations-implications-
for-opioid-addiction-treatment/.
451. Id. at 17.
452. Id. at 19. A review by the American Psychiatric Association found that some
states' benchmark plans excluded or limited access to addiction medications, including
California's benchmark plan, which covers methadone but only for pregnant women.
Scully Letter, supra note 442.
453. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 400-413 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 414-418 and accompanying text.
456. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 399 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 422-430 and accompanying text.
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Numerous regulators have a role to play in enforcing the ACA's
prohibitions on discrimination. In general, the states have the authority
to enforce the ACA's health insurance-related requirements.45 9  CMS
steps in where "a State has failed to substantially enforce a provision (or
provisions) in this part with respect to health insurance issuers in the
State[.],,460 In addition, as discussed above, the FFM and the state
Exchanges can use their certification authority to ensure that QHPs are
not intentionally designed to attract low-risk enrollees.461 State insurance
departments can play a similar role for plans offered for sale outside of
the exchanges.
HHS' Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") is charged with enforcing
the various federal laws that prohibit discrimination in health care
programs.462 On its website, OCR announces that it "is responsible for
enforcing Section 1557" and that it "has been accepting and investigating
complaints under this authority.463 The Department of Justice ("DOJ")
coordinates the enforcement of all of the federal antidiscrimination laws
by all of the executive agencies, including HHS.464 DOJ can also bring
suit to enforce the antidiscrimination laws.4 65 In addition, individuals
harmed by discrimination can bring private lawsuits for money damages
and equitable relief, such as a court order directing a health insurer to
stop using a discriminatory plan design.466
Section 1557 provides that "[t]he enforcement mechanisms
provided for and available under Title VI, Title IX, section 504, or such
Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations of [Section
1557]."467 However, as OCR notes in its Request for Information,
"[t]hese civil rights laws may be enforced in different ways. 46 8 OCR
459. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22 (2012).
460. Id.
461. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e).
462. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and
Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,823 (Feb. 27, 2015).
463. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Section 1557 of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, HHS.Gov,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/understanding/section1557/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2014).
464. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 12, 1980),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/EO 12250.pdf.
465. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Civil Rights Division: About the Division,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
466. Letter from Emily Spitzer, Executive Director, National Health Law Program,
to Leon Rodriguez, Director, Officer for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HHS-OCR-
2013-0007-0049.
467. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
468. Request for Information Regarding Nondiscrimination in Certain Health
Programs or Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,558, 46,560 (Aug. 1, 2013).
[Vol. 120:1
HEALTH INSURER MARKET BEHAVIOR
goes on to explain that "Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504 have one set
of established administrative procedures for investigation of entities that
receive federal financial assistance from [HHS]," while "[t]he Age Act
has a separate administrative procedure that is similar, but requires
mediation before an investigation.'469 OCR asks for comments on the
effectiveness of the different approaches to enforcement and for ways in
which they could be strengthened.470
Katie Keith and her colleagues argue that "ensuring that the ACA's
nondiscrimination standards are met likely requires ongoing monitoring
of consumer complaints, the development of new infrastructure such as
tracking systems, robust grievance and appeals processes, and
clarification of federal requirements.,471 They also recommend that "[iun
reevaluating essential health benefits standards for 2016, HHS should




When he signed the ACA into law, President Obama cited as its
"core principle" that "everybody should have some basic security when it
comes to their health care. 4 73  Basic security in health care has a
financial component (access to health insurance) and a clinical
component (access to appropriate health care). The ACA has made
significant strides in advancing the financial goal, as millions have newly
gained access to insurance. Those gaining insurance through small-
group and individual coverage are entering a complex market with the
conflicting goals of extending care and restraining cost. Wise decisions
by consumers, market participants, and regulators can help to ensure that
the balance struck between cost and care is the proper one.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. KEITH ET AL., supra note 322, at 16.
472. Id At 5.
473. Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of the Health
Insurance Reform Bill, WHITEHoUSE.GOV, (Mar. 23, 2010, 11:29 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-
signing-health-insurance-reform-bill.
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